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I. Introduction
Goodwill is an elusive concept.' Attempts to adequately define it
t The author thanks ProfessorsJenniferJ. S. Brooks and Denise D. Roy for their
assistance in the completion of this Comment.
t Aristotle POSTERIOR ANALYrICs, Book II, Chapter 2, reprinted in, WALTER
KAUFMAN, PHILOSOPHIC CLASSICS, VOLUME 1: THALES TO OCKHAM 295 (2d ed. 1968).
1. The label "goodwill" has numerous and varying meanings, as one court noted:
Goodwill sometimes is used to describe the aggregate of all of the
intangibles of a business.... Since a normal rate of return usually
is calculated on tangible assets only, goodwill has been used as a
synonym for the return on all the intangibles of a business. In a
more restricted sense, goodwill is the expectancy that the old
customers will resort to the old place. It is the sum total of all the
imponderable qualities that attract customers and bring patronage
to the business without contractual compulsion. Another definition
equates goodwill with a rate of return on investment which is above
1
Skytte: Changing the Rules, but not the Goodwill Game: Newark Morning Led
Published by Mitchell Hamline Open Access, 2014
WLL!AM M/TCF-ELL LAW REVIEW
have stymied tax lawyers, scholars, and the Internal Revenue Service,
since the advent of the income tax in the United States Taxpayers
have yearned for a clear definition of goodwill so as to avoid the tax
consequences of its label,3 because traditionally, goodwill has been a
non-depreciable, 4 intangible asset.'
normal returns in the industry and limits it to the residual
intangible asset that generates earnings in excess of a normal
return on all other tangible and intangible assets.
Richard S. Miller & Sons, Inc. v. United States, 537 F.2d 446, 450-51 (Ct. Cl. 1976)
(citations omitted). See generally RobertJ. McDonald, Goodwill and the Federal Income Tax,
45 VA. L. REV. 645 (1959); Note, An Inquiy Into the Nature of Goodwill, 53 COLUM. L.
REV. 660 (1953); Floyd A. Wright, The Nature And Basis OfLgal Goodwill, 24 ILL. L. REv.
20 (1929).
2. The Tariff of 1909 permitted corporate depreciation deductions without
expressly discriminating between tangible and intangible property. T.D. 1536, 12
Treas. Dec. Int. Rev. 96 (1909) (permitting deductions from gross income for "all losses
actually sustained within the year and not compensated by insurance or otherwise,
including a reasonable allowance for depreciation of property, if any"); see also Newark
Morning Ledger Co. v. United States, 113 S. Ct. 1670, 1674 (1993) (observing that the
depreciation deduction has been a part of the federal tax system at least since the
passage of the Tariff of 1909, specifically, § 38 Second, 36 Stat. 11, 113). When
goodwill was later precluded from the depreciation deduction in 1911, the stage was
set for the ensuing years of contests between taxpayer and government. T.D. 1675, 14
Treas. Dec. Int. Rev. 21 (1911) (expressly excluding depreciation deductions for "good
will").
3. Prior to the adoption of Internal Revenue Code Section 197, goodwill was a
non-depreciable intangible asset. The General Accounting Office ("GAO") noted:
When these conflicts arise, they are caused by the disparity between
the tax treatment of (1) goodwill and other nonamortizable
intangible assets without determinable useful lives and (2) amortiz-
able intangible assets with taxpayer-determined useful lives. This
disparity gives taxpayers an incentive to establish values and useful
lives for purchased intangible assets other than goodwill.
UNITED STATES GENERAL ACCOUNTING OFFICE, GAO/GGD-91-88, Tax Policy: Issues and
Policy Proposals Regarding Tax Treatment of Intangible Assets, 5 (August 1991). The GAO
also noted: "[W]e believe that taxpayer's determinations [of a purchased intangible
asset's actual value and economic useful life] could be influenced by their tax
consequences." Id. at 38.
4. Typically, the term "depreciation" refers to the concept of recovering the
original capital invested in tangible or capital assets used in a business over the asset's
estimated useful life. MartinJ. Gregorcich, Amortization of Intangibles: A Reassessment
of the Tax Treatment of Purchased Goodwil 28 TAX LAW. 251, 252 (1975). The term
"amortization" refers to the same concept, except applied to a business' intangible
assets. Id. at 253. This Comment will follow the statutory and regulatory convention
that predominately applies the term "depreciation" to both tangible and intangible
property.
5. An intangible asset is property that is "immune to physical forces .... and
unless limited in duration by statute or contract or so closely linked to a physical asset
as to be rendered worthless by its retirement from service, they are unaffected by the
mere passage of time." BORis I. BITTKER & MARTINJ. MCMAHONJR., FEDERAL INCOME
TAXATION OF INDIVIDUALS 12.4, at 12-10 (1988 & Cum. Supp. No. 2, 1994). For
[Vol. 21
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Motivated by the desire for deductions, taxpayers have tested the
definition of goodwill.6 The resulting case history reveals divergent
treatment of these controversies.7 The Supreme Court, in Newark
Morning Ledger Co. v. United States,' finally brought unity to the judicial
approach to depreciating intangibles and defining goodwill. The
Court held that a taxpayer may depreciate an intangible asset,
regardless of how much the asset appears to reflect "the expectancy of
[goodwill]" 9 when a particular asset is proven to have an ascertainable
value and a limited useful life.' °
The decision was followed closely by the adoption of Internal
Revenue Code [hereinafter "Code"] Section 197," which provides a
mandatory fifteen-year depreciation period for goodwill and other
specified intangibles. 2 While Section 197 resolved many of the
controversies regarding the depreciation of intangible assets (including
goodwill), it also disadvantages taxpayers who acquire "Section 197
intangibles" 3 with useful lives less than fifteen years."
example, intangible assets include rights such as patents, copyrights, and trademarks,
or an asset that lacks physical existence, such as goodwill. "A nonphysical, non-current
asset which exists only in connection with something else, such as the goodwill of a
business." BLACK'S LAw DICTIONARY 808 (6th ed. 1990).
6. With goodwill being non-depreciable under the Internal Revenue Code prior
to 1993, taxpayers sought to distinguish depreciable intangible assets from goodwill.
In a report exploring the intangible asset conundrum, the GAO observed that IRS
audits "most frequently challenged the classifications rather than the useful lives
and/or values that taxpayers assigned to... intangible assets." GAO/GGD-91-88, supra
note 5, at 3. The rationale for this phenomenon is based simply on the time
preference for money: it is more desirable to take current deductions against gross
income over delaying until a later disposition of an asset because the opportunity-value
of a quantum of money now is valued more highly than the same quantum in the
future. BANKING TERMINOLOGY 274 (3d ed. 1989) (also called present value).
7. Justice Souter, writing for the dissent in Newark Morning Ledger, observed that
"the law concerning the depreciation of intangible assets related to goodwill has
developed on a case-by-case basis." 113 S. Ct. 1670, 1685 n.4 (1993).
8. Id. at 1670.
9. Id. at 1683.
10. Id. at 1681 ("[A] taxpayer able to prove that a particular asset can be valued
and that it has a limited useful life may depreciate its value over its useful life
regardless of how much the asset appears to reflect the expectancy of continued
patronage [goodwill] .... ).
11. I.R.C. § 197. All citations to I.R.C. are to the Internal Revenue Code of 1986,
as amended.
12. I.R.C. § 197(a) ("A taxpayer shall be entitled to an amortization deduction
with respect to any amortizable Section 197 intangible. The amount of such deduction
shall be determined by amortizing the adjusted basis ... ratably over the 15-year period
13. I.R.C. § 197(d) (listing "Section 197 intangible" assets).
14. The United States House of Representatives' report concerning Section 197
recognized the detrimental tax effect on some intangibles: "It is recognized that the
1995]
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Notwithstanding this Code change, the fuel for substantive contro-
versy still exists for intangible assets falling both inside and outside the
scope of Section 197. The ambiguity surrounding the nature of
goodwill has not disappeared, and under certain circumstances, the
incentive remains for taxpayers to avoid allocation of purchase price
to goodwill when other assets have shorter useful lives.15 This
lingering uncertainty will continue to strain the resources of both
concerned taxpayers and the government unless the nature of
goodwill is clarified within the Code and Treasury Regulations 6
[hereinafter "Regulations"]. Despite the lack of statutory explicitness,
however, the Newark Morning Ledger decision provides precedent
whereby taxpayers may establish the propriety of claimed depreciation
deductions for contested intangible asset depreciation. 7
useful lives of certain acquired intangible assets to which the bill applies may be shorter
than 14 years [changed to 15 years in Conference Committee], while the useful lives
of other acquired intangible assets to which the bill applies may be longer than 14
years." H.R. REP. No. 2141, 103d Cong., 1st Sess. 323 (1993), reprinted in The Revenue
Reconciliation Act of 1993, 211 (Research Instit. Am. 1993); see also George Brode, Jr.,
Structuring Taxable Acquisitions of Intangibles Under Section 197, 60 TAx NOTES 1011, 1019-
20 (1993) (providing further commentary on this point). The flat 15-year depreciation
period for Section 197 intangibles was a revenue balancing measure that treated those
intangibles with arguably shorter useful lives than 15 years (examples: covenants not
to compete, patents, copyrights) the same as those with indeterminate useful lives
(examples: goodwill and going-concern value). See Kevin M. Helmich, The Amortization
of Intangible Assets: An Analysis of H.R. 3035 Proposed by House Ways and Means Committee
Chairman Dan Rostenkowsk, 55 TAx NOTES 987, 991-92 (1992) (advocating that most
industries would not be affected by the offsetting losses and gains from a standardized
amortization period).
15. See Russell W. Coff and Eric G. Flamholtz, Corporate Investments in Human
Capital. How Financial Accounting Standards Undermine Public Policy, 5 STAN. L. & POLY
REV. 31, 37 (Fall 1993) ("In its current form, this bill would create incentives to allocate
the purchase price to equipment and other assets with a useful life of less than
fourteen years and might actually provide a disincentive for acquiring land and
buildings which have longer useful lives.").
16. At the end of 1993, over 8000 intangible-depreciation issues were pending
before the IRS. IRS Official Discusses Settlement of Intangibles Cases, TAX NOTES TODAY
(Nov. 4, 1993) (LEXIS, FEDTAX, TNT file, elec. cit. 93 TNT 204-1). The GAO
reported over 2100 open audit cases relating to intangible assets for the tax years 1979
to 1987. GAO/GGD-91-88, supra note 5, at 13. The Internal Revenue Service
[hereinafter "Service" or "IRS"] has made efforts to dispose of many cases by way of a
settlement initiative. IRS Briefing Materials, reprinted in TAX NOTES TODAY (Feb. 9, 1994)
(LEXIS, FEDTAX, TNT file, elec. cit. 94 TNT 30-8); see also Ken C. Jones and Joan L.
Rood, Evaluating the Service's Settlement Initiative for Intangible Assets, 80 J. TAX'N 196
(evaluating settlement offer); IRS Offers to Settle Intangible Disputes, 52 TAX'N FOR ACCT.
237 (April 1994) (evaluating settlement offer). While the number of classification cases
might never again rise to the pre-Section 197 levels, the fundamental problem giving
rise to the old cases still exists.
17. The Supreme Court in Newark Morning Ledger held that when a taxpayer meets
the burden of proof that the disputed intangible asset has an ascertainable value and
[Vol. 21
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This Comment recounts the case history leading up to the Newark
Morning Ledger decision and identifies two major schools of thought
concerning the definition of goodwill. These competing approaches
are: (1) the substantivist school, which holds out a substantive,
dispositive meaning of goodwill; i" and (2) the residualist school,
which views goodwill as that which is "left-over" after accounting for all
other identifiable assets.' 9 Next, it examines the Newark Morning
Ledger controversy and decisions,2" and concludes with an examina-
tion of its significance in light of Section 197.21 Generally, this
Comment advocates the residualist method of defining goodwill as a
viable and profitable basis for establishing the depreciation of
intangible assets in the aftermath of Section 197. Three issues are
identified where the Newark Morning Ledger decision continues to
provide controlling precedent for the depreciation of intangible assets:
(1) valuation issues,22 (2) duration issues,23 and (3) characterization
issues.24
II. Statutory and Regulatory Framework
Depreciation deductions have been a part of the federal tax system
since its inception. 5 More recently, Code Section 167 has allowed
depreciation deductions for an asset's "exhaustion, wear and tear."26
Pursuant to Section 167, Congress limits depreciation deductions to a
"reasonable allowance"27 for the wasting value of property used in a
trade or business, 28 or property held for the production of in-
come.2" Under the Regulations 0 accompanying this section, the
a reasonably ascertainable limited useful life, the asset's relationship to goodwill is
irrelevant. Newark Morning Ledger, 113 S. Ct. at 1680-81. By meeting this burden of
proof, the taxpayer has proved that the asset does not have a useful life of infinite
duration, but instead suffers wear and tear, a characteristic inconsistent with the
traditional notion of goodwill. Id. at 1680.
18. See infra Part III.A.
19. See infra Part III.B.
20. See infra Part VIA
21. See infra Part VI.B.
22. See infra Part VI.B.1.
23. See infra Part VI.B.2.
24. See infra Part VI.B.3.
25. Tariff of 1909, § 38 Second, 36 Stat. 11, 115 (recognizing a "reasonable
allowance for depreciation of [corporate held] property").
26. I.R.C. § 167(a). Quoted in full, Section 167(a) states: "There shall be allowed
as a depreciation deduction a reasonable allowance for the exhaustion, wear and tear
(including a reasonable allowance for obsolescence) (1) of property used in the trade
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amount deducted in any particular year must be within the parameters
of a "consistent plan,"3 which is one resulting in the aggregate
amount depreciated over the course of the asset's estimated useful
life,32 plus any salvage value, equaling the cost of the asset.33  Over
the years, the basic form of this statute has undergone little change. 4
The Regulations accompanying Section 167 recognize depreciation
deductions for both intangible35 and tangible3 6 properties. The two
forms of property, however, depreciate differently. An intangible asset
30. Regulations are interpretations or clarifications of the provisions of the
Internal Revenue Code, issued by the Treasury Department on the authority of
Congress, that "carry the force" of the statute they interpret. WILLIAM A. RAABE ET AL.,
WEST'S FEDERAL TAX RESEARCH 577 (1994).
31. Treas. Reg. § 1.167(a)-la (as amended in 1972). "The allowance is that
amount which should be set aside for the taxable year in accordance with a reasonably
consistent plan (not necessarily at a uniform rate) .... ." Id.
32. The asset's "useful life" is a reasonable estimate, not necessarily the inherent
useful life of the asset. Treas. Reg. § 1.167(a)-lb (as amended in 1972). This estimate
must be based on the period of time "the asset may reasonably be expected to be useful
to the taxpayer in his trade or business or in the production of his income." Id. The
useful life is established in accordance with the taxpayer's experience with similar
property, taking into account the impact of present and probable future circumstances.
Id. The Regulation also provides: "If the taxpayer's experience is inadequate [for
determining useful life], the general experience in the industry may be used until such
time as the taxpayer's own experience forms an adequate basis for making the
determination." Id. (emphasis added).
33. Treas. Reg. § 1.167(a)-la (as amended in 1972). The Regulation states that
the depreciation plan must achieve the following consistency:
[T]he aggregate of the amounts set aside, plus the salvage value,
will, at the end of the estimated useful life of the depreciable
property, equal the cost or other basis of the property as provided
in Section 167(g) and § 1.167(g)-1.
Id.
34. Changes to the statute were minor. The 1913 Revenue Act provided for the
depreciation of property "used in the trade or business," while the 1942 Revenue Act
added, "property held by the taxpayer for the production of income." 1913 Act, Sec.
II, B; 1942 Act, Sec. 121(c). The most noteworthy changes came at the level of
Treasury Decisions and Regulations. The Treasury Decision accompanying the Tariff
of 1909 did not distinguish intangible from tangible property for the purposes of
allowing a depreciation deduction. Treas. Reg. 31, Art. 4, p. 11 (1909). However, this
changed in 1914, when the Treasury promulgated Treas. Reg. 33 (1914) under the
1913 Income Tax Law. In that Regulation, depreciation deductions were limited to
tangible property. Id. See also Newark Morning Ledger, 113 S. CL at 1674 (providing a
brief history of the depreciation deduction).
35. Treas. Reg. § 1.167(a)-3 (as amended in 1960) ("If an intangible asset is known
... to be of use.., for only a limited period.., such an intangible asset may be the
subject of a depreciation allowance.").
36. Treas. Reg. § 1.167(a)-2 (as amended in 1956) ("The depreciation allowance
in the case of tangible property applies only to that part of the property which is
subject to wear and tear. .. ").
[Vol. 21
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THE GOODWILL GAME
is depreciable 7 if it "is known ... to be of use ... for only a limited
period, the length of which can be estimated with reasonable accuracy
... 38 In contrast, more explicit Code provisions outline the
depreciation of tangible property.39 They provide for depreciation
so long as the asset is "subject to wear and tear, to decay or decline
from natural causes, to exhaustion, and to obsolescence."'
Regulation Section 1.167(a)-3 specifically deals with the depreciation
of intangible property.4 This Regulation provides for the possible
depreciation of an intangible asset, known to be of use for a limited
time, when that period can be estimated with reasonable accuracy.4"
Under Section 167, an intangible asset with an unlimited useful life is
not depreciable.43 The taxpayer bears the factual burden to support
a claimed deduction for an intangible asset, as no allowance will be
made based on the taxpayer's "unsupported opinion."44 Finally, this
Regulation allows no deduction for the depreciation of goodwill.45
A "floodtide"46 of litigation has flowed from these concise guide-
lines.47 The effect of denying depreciation for goodwill stimulated
taxpayers to prove, whenever possible, that an intangible property was
depreciable within the requirements of Regulation Section 1.167(a)-
3.48 Generally, conforming with the time-preference-for-money
principle,49 individuals value the current use of money more highly
than future use. This principle, coupled with the non-depreciability
of the intangible "goodwill" prior to section 197, produced an
37. See supra note 5 and accompanying text.
38. Treas. Reg. § 1.167(a)-3 (as amended in 1960).
39. Section 168 lists depreciation periods applicable to specific tangible assets
under the accelerated cost recovery provisions. I.R.C. § 168(c).
40. Treas. Reg. § 1.167(a)-2 (as amended in 1956).
41. Treas. Reg. § 1.167(a)-3 (as amended in 1960).
42. Id. (providing depreciation allowances for intangible assets that are useful for
"only a limited period, the length of which can be estimated with reasonable accuracy
43. Id. ("An intangible asset, the useful life of which is not limited, is not subject
to the allowance for depreciation.").
44. Id. ("No allowance will be permitted merely because, in the unsupported
opinion of the taxpayer, the intangible asset has a limited useful life.").
45. Id. ("No deduction for depreciation is allowable with respect to good will.");
see also infra, Part V (discussing I.R.C. § 197).
46. See Houston Chronicle Publishing Co. v. United States, 481 F.2d 1240, 1243
(5th Cir. 1973), cert. denied, 414 U.S. 1129 (1974) ("These deceptively uncomplicated
words have, however, led to a floodtide of litigated cases .... ").
47. Id.
48. Treas. Reg. § 1.167(a)-3 (as amended in 1960) ("If an intangible asset is known
to be of use ... for only a limited period, the length of which can be estimated
with reasonable accuracy, such an intangible asset may be the subject of a depreciation
allowance.").
49. See supra note 6 and accompanying text.
1995]
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incentive for taxpayers to distinguish depreciable intangible assets
from goodwill, so as to recapture its cost sooner rather than later.
5 °
III. Goodwill and Caselaw History
The first case directly addressing the depreciation of goodwill was
Red Wing Malting Co. v. Willcuts.51 The particular question before the
Eighth Circuit in Red Wing was whether a malt barley manufacturer,
whose market was destroyed as a result of the Prohibition Amend-
ment,52 was entitled to a deduction because of the obsolescence of
its goodwill.53 The court affirmed the trial court in dismissing Red
Wing Malting's petition.
54
In reaching its decision, the Red Wing court interpreted the scope
of Section 234,"5 the predecessor to Code Section 167. 56 The court
reasoned that while goodwill was indeed "property of an intangible
nature,"5 7 it was distinguishable from patents, copyrights and other
intangibles in that goodwill was not susceptible to wear and tear.5"
50. See Michael J. Douglass, Tangible Results For Intangible Assets: An Analysis of New
Code Section 197, 47 TAx LAw. 713, 713 (1994) ("To help minimize the amount of
purchase price allocated to goodwill, taxpayers resorted to allocating purchase price to
various intangible assets, such as 'recipes,' 'drawings,' and 'disadvantage competition,'
and amortized such creative intangibles assets over their useful lives.") (foomote
omitted).
51. 15 F.2d 626 (8th Cir. 1926), cert. denied, 273 U.S. 763 (1927) (affirming a
judgment denying deductions for the obsolescence of goodwill).
52. U.S. CONsT. amend. XVIII, repealed by U.S. CONST. amend. XXI.
53. 15 F.2d at 627-28.
54. 15 F.2d at 634 ("We have reached the conclusion that the action of the trial
court in dismissing plaintiff's petition and rendering judgment for defendant was
correct, and the same is affirmed.").
55. Revenue Act of 1918, § 234(a) (4), (7), ch. 18, 40 Stat. 1057, 1077-78 (1919).
56. 15 F.2d at 628. The particular portion of the provision quoted in the opinion
reads:
That in computing the net income of a corporation subject to the
tax imposed by Section 230 there shall be allowed as deductions:
... (4) Losses sustained during the taxable year and not compen-
sated for by insurance or otherwise; ... (7) A reasonable allowance
for the exhaustion, wear and tear of property used in the trade or
business, including a reasonable allowance for obsolescence.
Revenue Act of 1918, § 234(a) (4), (7), ch. 18, 40 Stat. 1057, 1077-78 (1919).
57. Red Wing Malting Co. v. Willcuts, 15 F.2d 626, 632 (8th Cir. 1926), cert. denied,
237 U.S. 763 (1927).
58. 15 F.2d at 633. Quoting in relevant part:
We are satisfied there can be no wear or tear of good will, or
exhaustion thereof by use, and, even should we assume that good
will, separate and distinct from tangible property, is property used
in the business .... the 1918 Revenue Act limits the allowance for
obsolescence to such property as is susceptible to exhaustion, wear,
and tear by use in the business, and good will is not such property.
[Vol. 21
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THE GOODWILL GAME
Consequently, goodwill did not fit within the 1918 Revenue Act's
allowance for obsolescence.59 Following the court's decision in Red
Wing, the Treasury Department amended the Regulations in 1927 to
deny a depreciation deduction for goodwill.6' This has been the
Service's position ever since.
Courts and commentators have observed that since 1927, the only
question litigated in this area of law has been whether a particular
intangible asset is goodwill, and therefore non-depreciable. 2 Since
59. The conclusion of the court in Red Wing Malting contravened the Service's
prior position of allowing depreciation deductions to distillers, dealers in liquors, and
brewers for the obsolescence of goodwill destroyed by the prohibition legislation. See
T.B.R. 44, 1 C.B. 133-34, 137-38 (1919); O.D. 298, 1 C.B. 138 (1919); see also O.D. 472,
2 C.B. 141 (1920) (permitting obsolescence of goodwill "in the case of the discontinu-
ance of a going business because of the exhaustion of its source of supply, where the
cost of the goodwill ... can be definitely shown and the period of its obsolescence
determined with reasonable accuracy."); O.D. 818, 4 C.B. 178-79 (1921) ("In the case
of liquor dealers the useful life of whose intangibles, such as good will, trade-marks and
trade brands, was definitely limited as a result of prohibition legislation, an allowance
for obsolescence is permissible.").
60. T.D. 4055, 6-2 C.B. 63 (1927). The Service recognized the depreciability of
goodwill as a result of the Prohibition Amendment between 1919 and 1927. Regulation
45, T.D. 2831, Art. 163 (1919) (providing for depreciation deductions); T.D. 4055, 6-2
C.B. 63 (1927) (prohibiting depreciation deductions). In relevant part, Regulation 45
stated:
Intangibles, the use of which in the trade or business is definitely
limited in duration, may be the subject of a depreciation allowance.
... Intangibles, the use of which in the business or trade is not so
limited, will not usually be a proper subject of such an allowance.
If, however, an intangible asset acquired through capital outlay is
known from experience to be of value in the business for only a
limited period, the length of which can be estimated from
experience with reasonable certainty, such intangible asset may be
the subject of a depreciation allowance . . . . No deduction for
depreciation . . . is allowable in respect of good will
Regulation 45, T.D. 2831, Art. 163 (1919) (emphasis added). This provision was
amended shortly thereafter to allow the depreciation of goodwill in light of the
Prohibition Amendment. T.B.R. 44, 1 C.B. 133-34, 137-38 (1919). Following Red Wing
Malting, the Treasury Department once again amended the Regulations, reinstating the
provision that: "No deduction for depreciation, including obsolescence, is allowable
in respect of good will." T.D. 4055, VI-2 C.B. 63 (1927).
61. Newark Morning Ledger, 113 S. Ct. at 1675 n.8; see also Clarke v. Haberle Crystal
Springs Brewing Co., 280 U.S. 384 (1930) (settling a conflict between jurisdictions by
holding that when a liquor "business is extinguished as noxious under the Constitu-
tion" no depreciation deductions are allowed for the obsolescence of goodwill).
62. See, e.g., Newark Morning Ledger, 113 S. Ct. at 1675 (citing Houston Chronicle, 481
F.2d at 1247); UNITED STATES GENERAL ACCOUNTING OFFICE, GAO/GGD-91-88, Tax
Policy: Issues and Policy Proposals Regarding Tax Treatment of Intangible Assets, 15 (August
1991) ("Most of the current disagreements over the tax treatment of purchased
intangible assets concern whether or not assets are separate from goodwill."); see also
Gregorcich, supra note 4, at 258-59 (stating that the litigated question has been
"whether a particular intangible asset is non-amortizable, either because it is a
1995]
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neither the Code nor the Regulations define the term "goodwill,""3
the ensuing years have seen many controversies, particularly concern-
ing customer-based intangibles, 64 with courts using markedly different
analyses65 to resolve the depreciability question.
It was Houston Chronicle Publishing Co. v. United States 6 that first
brought clarity to the court conventions evaluating depreciation
allowances for customer-based intangibles.67 There, the Houston
Chronicle Publishing Company [hereinafter "the Chronicle"] had
acquired a competing local newspaper.' Among the assets pur-
chased were all of the former newspaper's subscription lists. 69  The
Chronicle claimed that the lists had an expected useful life of five
years and sought depreciation deductions for a portion of that
value.70  When the IRS denied the deductions, the Chronicle filed
component of ordinary goodwill, or because it is so much like goodwill that the reasons
for denying amortization deductions are fully applicable").
63. See Regulation 45, T.D. 2831, Art. 163 (1919); T.B.R. 44, 1 C.B. 133 (1919);
T.D. 4055, VI-2 C.B. 63 (1927).
64. With the traditional description of goodwill being "the expectancy of
continued patronage," it is not surprising that most tax controversies in this area
involved customer-based assets, such as customer and subscription lists, insurance
expirations, bank deposits, and "any other identifiable asset the value of which
obviously depends on the continued and voluntary patronage of customers." Newark
Morning Ledger, 113 S. Ct. at 1676 (1993) (recognizing that customer-based intangibles
have given the IRS and the courts difficulty). See Boe v. Commissioner, 307 F.2d 339,
343 (9th Cir. 1962) ("[T]he essence of goodwill is the expectancy of continued
patronage, for whatever reason."). In other words, because Regulation § 1-167(a)-3
explicitly settled the idea that goodwill was non-amortizable as a matter of law, the only
question remaining was "whether a particular asset is 'goodwill.'" Houston Chronicle, 481
F.2d at 1247.
65. In looking at the case law before it, the Fifth Circuit noted that "[n]o single
rule for the tax treatment of 'intangible property' emerges from those cases and no
black-letter statement of the applicable law is available to guide our decision." Houston
Chronicle, 481 F.2d at 1243. SeeWinn-Dixie Montgomery, Inc. v. United States, 444 F.2d
677, 685-87 (5th Cir. 1971) (affirming denial of deduction for acquisition costs of
leaseholds); Commissioner v. Seaboard Fin. Co., 367 F.2d 646, 652-53 (9th Cir. 1966)
(affirming finding that 30 percent of premium attributable to goodwill); Boe, 307 F.2d
at 339, 342-44 (affirming denial of deduction for acquisition of medical doctor's
practice as it was indistinguishable from goodwill).
66. 481 F.2d 1240 (5th Cir. 1973), cert. denied, 414 U.S. 1129 (1974).
67. See Newark Morning Ledger, 113 S. Ct. at 1678 (noting that Houston Chronicle
.clarified that the availability of the depreciation allowance was primarily a question of
fact").
68. Houston Chronicle, 481 F.2d at 1243-44.
69. Id. The Houston Chronicle did not intend to continue operating its
acquisition, the Houston Press Company, but considered the lists valuable anyway in
light of the likelihood that some of the Press' former customers would become
Chronicle subscribers. Id.
70. Id. at 1244.
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suit and its contentions were put to a jury which found in its favor.7'
The case went to the Fifth Circuit on appeal after the trial court
denied the government's motion for judgment notwithstanding the
verdict.
72
Rendering its opinion for the taxpayer, the Fifth Circuit held that
the question of depreciability was indeed a fact question.7" In so
holding the court put to rest the notion that certain intangibles were
non-depreciable as a matter of law." In particular, the court noted
the precedential irrelevance of the "mass asset"75 rule. The mass
asset rule denied depreciation deductions as a matter of law when
individual assets,76 or separate assets taken together,77 were substan-
tially related to "goodwill." The court characterized goodwill as
"possessing no determinable useful life and having self-regenerating
capability."" Instead of following this per se analysis, the court stated
71. Id. at 1244-45.
72. Houston Chronicle Publishing Co. v. United States, 481 F.2d 1240, 1245 (5th
Cir. 1973), cert. denied, 414 U.S. 1129 (1974).
73. Id. at 1253-54 ("Our view-that amortizability for tax purposes must turn on
factual bases-is more in accord with the realities of modem business technology in a
day when lists are bartered and sold as discrete vendible assets.").
74. Id. at 1249.
75. Id. at 1249-50. The "mass asset" rule finds its point of origin in Danville Press,
Inc. v. Commissioner. 1 B.TA. 1171 (1925). There, the court denied depreciation of
a newspaper's 9,000 at-will subscriptions, reasoning that this type of intangible did not
expire, but merely fluctuated in value "from time to time." Id. The mass-asset, or
indivisible-asset, rule, according to the Supreme Court, provides
that certain kinds of intangible assets are properly grouped and
considered as a single entity; even though the individual compo-
nents of the asset may expire or terminate over time, they are
replaced by new components, thereby causing only minimal
fluctuations and no measurable loss in the value of the whole.
Newark Morning Ledger, 113 S. Ct. at 1676. The rule has been cited to support the
notion that certain intangible assets, like goodwill, are per se non-depreciable because
of their self-regenerating character. For example, a subscription list is composed of
numerous individual subscribers whose subscriptions expire over time for various
reasons. However, as some subscriptions terminate new subscribers replace those lost,
resulting in only value fluctuations of the subscription list and no significant net loss
overall. See id. at 1676.
76. Houston Chronicle, 481 F.2d at 1249 (referring to Golden State Towel & Linen
Serv. Ltd. v. United States, 373 F.2d 938, 944 (Ct. Cl. 1967)).
77. Houston Chronicle Publishing Co. v. United States, 481 F.2d 1240, 1247 (5th
Cir. 1973) (citing Winn-Dixie Montgomery, Inc. v. United States, 444 F.2d 677 (5th Cir.
1971)), cert. denied, 414 U.S. 1129 (1974) . The Fifth Circuit Court of Appeals stated
that the "mass asset" principle applied in cases where "intangible assets are treated as
a single entity which, unlike its individual components, is considered to have no
determinate useful life and is nondepreciable." Winn-Dixie Montgomery, 444 F.2d at 686
(holding that the mass asset rule did not apply in a dispute over whether goodwill was
purchased at all in the acquisition of a going-concern).
78. Houston Chronicle, 481 F.2d at 1249.
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that case outcomes turned on the evidentiary support offered by
taxpayers in support of their position. 9
The Houston Chronicle court established that depreciation deductions
for the value of intangible assets were proper only when a taxpayer
met a difficult evidentiary burden.8" Taking into account Code
Section 167(a) and Regulation 1.167(a)-3, the court articulated the
following test: deductions were allowable only if "the taxpayer
properly carries his dual burden of proving that the intangible asset
involved (1) has an ascertainable value separate and distinct from
goodwill, and (2) has a limited useful life, the duration of which can
be ascertained with reasonable accuracy."
8  Examining the record, 2
the court concluded that the Chronicle's proffered evidence was
sufficient to defeat the government's motion.83
The years following the Houston Chronicle decision witnessed a re-
drawing of the battle lines.8 4 While courts consistently recognized
that the depreciation deduction issue was a question of fact,8" the
79. Id. ("Most of the cases purporting to apply the 'mass asset' rule involve
evidentiary failures on the part of the taxpayer."). The Fifth Circuit supported its
contention by citing Thrifticheck Serv. Corp. v. Commissioner, 287 F.2d 1 (2d Cir.
1961) which denied depreciation deductions for customer contacts based on the
taxpayer's failure to prove a limited useful life and Marsh & McLennan, Inc. v.
Commissioner, 420 F.2d 667 (3d Cir. 1969) which denied deprecation deductions on
two grounds, one of which was the taxpayer's failure to prove a limited useful life with
reasonable accuracy. Houston Chronicle, 481 F.2d at 1249.
80. Houston Chronicle, 481 F.2d at 1250.
81. Id.
82. Evidence that proved particularly significant for the court in sustaining the
jury's verdict included testimony of the Chronicle's officers, testimony of employees
and expert witnesses concerning the cost of obtaining new subscriptions, similar
testimony regarding the useful life estimates of the subscription lists, and results taken
from the Chronicle's survey of its current subscribers concerning the useful life of an
average subscription. Id. at 1253.
83. Id. The court stated: "We think that this direct testimony rises above the level
of 'unsupported opinion of the taxpayer' and thus satisfies... Treas. Reg. § 1.167(a)-3
* . . and we conclude that the very able trial judge correctly submitted the case to the
jury." Id.
84. See Reuven S. Avi-Yonah, "Amortization of Intangibles," 533 T.M. A-21. Mr.
Avi-Yonah notes:
From 1973 to 1993, the IRS attempted to attack taxpayers' amor-
tization deductions arguing that certain intangibles are by their
nature or definition inseparable from goodwill or going concern
value and, therefore, do not meet the two-pronged test of Houston
Chronicle. In essence, the IRS attempted to add to the test a third,
definitional prong, requiring that an asset be separate and distinct
from goodwill as well as have an ascertainable value and limited
useful life.
Id.
85. See, e.g., Donrey, Inc. v. United States, 809 F.2d 534, 536 (8th Cir. 1987)
(maintaining that taxpayer was entitled to depreciation deduction for subscription list
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identification of non-depreciable goodwill branched into two schools
of thought. On one hand, the concept of goodwill was seen as the
expectancy of continued patronage.8 6 Under this approach, deduc-
tions were improper for any intangible that could not be adequately
distinguished from the over-arching notion of customer patronage.87
Alternatively, it was argued that Code Section 167 and Regulation
Section 1.167(a)-3 premised an intangible asset's depreciation on
whether it had a limited useful life that could be determined with
reasonable accuracy.8" Goodwill, however, was presumed to have "a
useful life of indefinite duration." 9 Consequently, goodwill was the
remaining intangible after all other assets with reasonably ascertainable
useful lives were distinguished." These alternative tests for identify-
ing depreciable intangibles from goodwill may be denominated,
respectively, (1) the substantivist9" school and (2) the residualist school. 2
of newspaper it purchased and that evidence substantiated that the subscription list had
a useful life of twenty-three years and had "ascertainable value separate and distinct
from goodwill"); General Television, Inc. v. United States, 449 F. Supp. 609, 611 (D.
Minn. 1978), affd per curiam, 598 F.2d 1148 (8th Cir. 1979); Richard S. Miller & Sons,
Inc. v. United States, 537 F.2d 446, 452 (Ct. Cl. 1976) ("Entitlement to a depreciation
allowance is a question of fact and not of law."); Sunset Fuel Co. v. United States, 519
F.2d 781, 784 (9th Cir. 1975).
86. See Boe, 307 F.2d at 343; AmSouth Bancorporation v. United States, 681 F.
Supp. 698 (N.D. Ala. 1988).
87. See Sunset Fuel, 519 F.2d at 783 & n.2 (noting that at-will customers individually
and aggregately were non-depreciable intangible assets because they were "essentially
goodwill themselves," giving the taxpayer the "opportunity and expectation of future
patronage").
88. Treas. Reg. § 1.167(a)-3 (1994). The Regulation states:
If an intangible asset is known from experience or other factors to
be of use in the business or in the production of income for only
a limited period, the length of which can be estimated with
reasonable accuracy, such an intangible asset may be the subject of
a depreciation allowance.
Id.
89. See Richard S. Miller, 537 F.2d at 452 ("[T]he most significant indication that
an intangible asset is separate and distinct from goodwill is whether its useful life can
be shown with reasonable accuracy to be of limited duration.").
90. See Note, Amortization of Intangibles: An Examination of the Tax Treatment of
Purchased Goodwill 81 HARv. L. REv. 859, 861 (1968) (advocating goodwill is the
"residual intangible asset"); McDonald, supra note 1, at 648 (describing goodwill as the
"indefinable something left over").
91. The substantivist test might also be called the "separate and distinct" test,
derived from the language of Regulation § 1.167(a)-3. See Sarah R. Lyke, Note,
INDOPCO, Inc. v. Commissioner: National Starch Decision Adds Wrinkles to Capital
Expenditure Issue, 88 Nw. U. L. REV. 1239 (1994) (examining the issue of distinguishing
deductible expenses from capital expenditures); Mark B. Persellin, Depreciaion of
Customer-Based Intangibles Confirmed by Supreme Court in Newark Morning Ledger, 45 TAX
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A. The Substantivist Approach
One way in which courts have addressed the intangible asset
depreciation issue is by quantifying the closeness of the relationship
between goodwill and the asset in question.93 As the name suggests,
substantivists regard goodwill as having a substantive definition 94-the
expectancy of continued patronage-that is dispositive of dep-
reciability.95 This approach incorporates a weighty presumption that
customer-based intangibles are non-depreciable because of their close
relationship to the notion of customer patronage.96 To summarize
the substantivist approach: if an intangible asset looks substantially
similar to the expectancy of continued patronage, then it is non-
depreciable.97
An example of the substantivist school of thought is General
Television, Inc. v. United States.9" In General Television, a community
92. See infra Part III.B.
93. See General Television, 449 F. Supp. at 611 ("Whether a particular intangible
capital asset may be depreciated... depends upon its identification with goodwill.");
Sunset Fuel 519 F.2d at 782-83 & n.2 (holding no depreciation for customer list since
it, and the individual terminable-at-will customers, were "essentially goodwill
themselves"); Boe, 307 F.2d at 342 (holding no depreciation for terminable-at-will
contracts since they "gave sufficient assurance of continued patronage," i.e., were
goodwill).
94. Newark Morning Ledger, 113 S. Ct. at 1674 ("The court concluded that goodwill
has a substantive meaning--the expectancy that 'old customers will resort to the old
place of business .... ') (quoting Newark Morning Ledger Co. v. United States, 945
F.2d 555, 567-68 (3d Cir. 1991)) (emphasis added).
95. See, e.g., Golden State Towel 373 F.2d at 944 (stating that the "principal element
of... goodwill ... lies in the expectancy of continued patronage through public
acceptance").
96. Newark Morning Ledger, 113 S. CL at 1676 (noting that "customer-based
intangibles" have given the Service and the courts difficulty). Customer-based
intangible is a name commonly given to an asset whose value is linked to the
"continued and voluntary patronage of customers," including customer and subscriber
lists, insurance expirations, and bank deposits. Id.
97. See General Television, 449 F. Supp. at 612-13 (denying depreciation for
subscriber contracts because they were essentially the "expectancy of continued
patronage"); cf. Newark Morning Ledger, 113 S. Ct. at 1680 n.13 ("The dissent's mistake
is to assume that because the 'paid subscribers' asset looks and smells like the
'expectancy of continued patronage,' it is, ipsofacto, nondepreciable.").
98. 449 F. Supp. 609 (D. Minn. 1978), aff"d per curiam, 598 F.2d 1148 (8th Cir.
1979). Less than a decade later the Eighth Circuit, in Donrey, Inc. v. United States,
commented that General Television was actually consistent with the residualist approach,
but had "simply applied the same test as used herein and reached a different
conclusion based on different facts." Donrey, Inc. v. United States, 809 F.2d 534, 537
(8th Cir. 1987). A close reading of General Television, however, reveals its substantivist
analysis. See Newark Morning Ledger, 945 F.2d at 566 (citing General Television in support
of its conclusion that prevailing law embraced the non-depreciability of any intangible
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television corporation was denied depreciation deductions for
subscriber lists acquired from several companies.99 The court initially
observed that allowance for the depreciation of intangibles was a fact
question0 ° and depended upon an asset's "identification with
goodwill."' 01 These subscriber lists were distinguishable from other
customer lists that had an "ascertainable value separate and apart from
goodwill." 2 As its rationale, the court held that these lists were
actually "customer structures which included the expectancy of
continued patronage."" 3 Since the expectancy of continued patron-
age is the essence of goodwill, the lists were non-depreciable."
B. The Residualist Approach
Alternatively, the residualist approach emphasizes the process of
identifying goodwill, as opposed to substantively defining it."05 This
that could not be adequately distinguished from goodwill, i.e., the expectancy of
continued patronage).
99. General Television purchased the assets of Delmarva Community Antenna
Corporation, Peninsula Community Television Company and Diamond State CATV,
Inc., of which intangible assets were valued at over $850,000. General Television, 449 F.
Supp. at 610-11.
100. General Television, 449 F. Supp. at 611 (citing Houston Chronicle, 481 F.2d at
1249).
101. General Television, 449 F. Supp. at 61, affd per curiam, 598 F.2d 1148 (8th Cir.
1979). The court identified several aspects that were incorporated in the concept of
goodwill, including the notion of "indefinite duration," and self-regeneration. Id.
What was dispositive, however, was the court's observation that "the expectancy of
continued patronage is the essence of goodwill." Id. at 612.
102. Id. at 610-11. The court cited several cases, including Houston Chronicle, as
examples of types of customer or subscriber lists that had an ascertainable value
separate and apart from goodwill. Id.
103. General Television, Inc. v. United States, 449 F. Supp. 609, 612 (D. Minn.
1978), affd per curiarm, 598 F.2d 1148 (8th Cir. 1979). Quoting in relevant part:
[W] hat the plaintiff purchased was more than mere subscriber lists
which could be used to identify potential customers; what it
purchased was customer structures which included the expectancy
of continued patronage. Therefore, because the purchases of the
subscriber lists were actually purchases of customer structures with
the expectancy of continued patronage and because the expectancy
of continued patronage is the essence of goodwill, the subscriber
lists constitute non-depreciable goodwill.
Id.
104. General Television, 449 F. Supp. at 612. The opinion was silent with regard to
the duration of the subscriber lists' useful life, which the court had made a point of
stating was an element of goodwill. Id. at 611 (citing Houston Chronicle).
105. See, e.g., IT & S of Iowa, Inc. v. Commissioner, 97 T.C. 496, 508 (1991) (stating
that whether a core deposit intangible was separate and distinct from goodwill was
essentially a factual inquiry determined by proper identification of the intangible asset);
Colorado Nat'l Bankshares, Inc. v. Commissioner, 60 T.C.M. 771, 789 (1990)
(purporting that amortizable assets include those intangible assets which are
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school of thought gains its name from equating goodwill with the
excess value over and above the value of all other tangible and
intangible assets in a business."°6 The concept is consistent with the
Code's requirement of allocating purchase price across all acquired
property.
10 7
For example, in the sale of a business the total purchase price is
allocated among the acquired assets in order to determine the value
of each item.'0 8 If the sale price is less than the sum of the values
of the individual assets, then the valuation attached to the individual
assets are reduced proportionately. 9 When the purchase price
exceeds the value of tangible assets and identifiable intangibles the
remainder, or residual, is allocated to goodwill."' To summarize the
residualist approach: if the intangible asset's useful life is not
amenable to a reasonable estimation of time, then it is not separate
and distinct from goodwill and is therefore non-depreciable."'
One of the clearest statements of the residualist position arose in
Donrey, Inc. v. United States."2  Donrey had purchased an Indiana
community newspaper for approximately $1.3 million." 3 Acquired
identifiable); Citizens & Southern Corp. v. Commissioner, 91 T.C. 463, 480 (1988)
(focusing on what intangible asset is being valued and depreciated as goodwill) affd,
900 F.2d 266 (11th Cir. 1990).
106. See Newark Morning Ledger; 945 F.2d at 564 (noting the alternative definition
equates goodwill with ... the residual intangible asset that generates earnings in excess
of a normal return . . .") (emphasis added).
107. See Reuven S. Avi-Yonah, Amortization of Intangibles, 533 T.M. A-4 (noting that
the prohibition against goodwill depreciation "underlied the residual method of
allocating purchase price"); George Mundstock, Taxation of Business Intangible Capita
135 U. PA. L. REV. 1179, 1206-07 & nn.142-47 (1987) ("When the purchase price
exceeds the value of tangible assets plus identifiable intangibles, the excess consider-
ation is allocated to goodwill.").
108. I.R.C. §§ 338(b) (5), 1060; seeMundstock, supra note 107, at 1206-07 &nn.142-
47 (describing purchase price allocation under I.R.C. §§ 338 and 1060).
109. See Mundstock, supra note 107, at 1206-07 & nn.142-47.
110. Treas. Reg. § 1.167(a)-5 (as amended by T.D. 8069,51 Fed. Reg. 1498 (1986));
see Mundstock, supra note 107, at 1206-07.
111. See Newark Morning Ledger, 113 S. Ct. at 1680 n. 13.
[Wlhether or not an asset is depreciable is not a question to be
settled by definition. 'Goodwill' remains nondepreciable under
applicable regulations. . . . In interpreting those regulations,
however, . . . [if] an asset [is] found to have a limited useful life
and an ascertainable value which may be determined with reason-
able accuracy, it is depreciable. By definition, therefore, it is not
goodwill.
Id. Articulated another way, goodwill is "no more than the residual value that remains
after all assets with determinable useful lives and ascertainable values have been
accounted for." Newark Morning Ledger, 945 F.2d at 560 (summarizing Morning
Ledger's argument).
112. 809 F.2d 534 (8th Cir. 1987).
113. Donrey, 809 F.2d at 535.
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in the transaction was a customer list of over 10,000 terminable-at-will
subscribers. 4 Donrey claimed depreciation deductions, which the
IRS denied, for a portion of the purchase price it allocated to the
subscription list. 1 5 Subsequently, a jury trial resulted in a verdict for
the taxpayer 16 and the government appealed." 7
The Eighth Circuit Court of Appeals affirmed the judgment of the
district court."' In arriving at its conclusion, the court initially
noted that the authority for depreciation deductions rested in Code
Section 167(a)," 9 which states that a deduction is permissible for
"'the exhaustion, wear and tear ... of property used in the trade or
business' of a taxpayer."120  The court then stated that "[g]oodwill
is conclusively presumed to have an unlimited useful life and as such
is ineligible per se for the depreciation deduction." 2 ' Those two
observations, coupled with the guidelines of the Houston Chronicle
test, I1 2 satisfied the court that the jury's findings of an ascertainable
value and limited life were reasonable given the facts, and consequent-
ly the deductions were proper123
114. Id.
115. Id.
116. Id. The jury answered special interrogatories and found: (1) that the
subscription list had a limited useful life; (2) that the duration of the useful life was
ascertainable with reasonable accuracy; (3) that the useful life of the list was twenty-
three years; (4) that it had an ascertainable value separate and distinct from goodwill;
and (5) that the value was $559,406. Id. at 536.
117. Id. at 535. The district court denied the government's motions for judgment
notwithstanding the verdict and a new trial, concluding that the verdict "was not
contrary to the great weight of the evidence." Id. at 535-36.
118. Donrey, Inc. v. United States, 809 F.2d 534, 537 (8th Cir. 1987).
119. Id. at 536.
120. Id. (quoting I.R.C. § 167(a)).
121. Id. at 536 (citing Regulation § 1.167(a)-3 and General Television, 449 F. Supp.
at 611). This proposition is consistent with a number of cases, particularly within the
Court of Claims and Tax Court. See, e.g., Richard S. Miller, 537 F.2d at 452 ("The most
important criterion is whether in fact it is a wasting asset."); Manhattan Co. of Virginia
v. Commissioner, 50 T.C. 78, 88 (1968) ("Goodwill has uniformly been held not to be
subject to depreciation since it is not generally a wasting asset of the business to which
it attaches, but rather an asset with an indefinite useful life."); see also GAO/GGD-91-88,
supra note 59, at 18 ("In 1927, the Department of the Treasury published regulations
containing the first statement that goodwill is not amortizable. Goodwill was generally
viewed as having an indeterminable useful life.").
122. Donrey, 809 F.2d at 536-37 ("The parties agree that the leading case involving
the depreciability of a newspaper subscription list is Houston Chronicle. . . .") (citation
omitted).
123. Id. at 537.
1995]
17
Skytte: Changing the Rules, but not the Goodwill Game: Newark Morning Led
Published by Mitchell Hamline Open Access, 2014
WILLIAM MITC-IELL LAW REVIEW
IV. Newark Morning Legder: Transaction and Court Decisions
No recent case has so clearly framed the historical debate over the
treatment of intangibles as Newark Morning Ledger Co. v. United
States.124  The competing notions of goodwill proved to be the
pivotal issue on which the various reviewing courts based their contrary
opinions. 125  After an initial verdict in favor of the taxpayer, 26 the
Third Circuit Court of Appeals reversed, 2 7 aligning itself steadfastly
with the substantivist approach. 128  In a five-four decision, 29 the
Supreme Court reversed again, advancing the residualist methodolo-
gy.130
A. The Acquisition
In 1976, over the course of several months, the Herald Company
[hereinafter "Herald"] purchased all the outstanding stock of Booth
Newspapers, Inc. [hereinafter "Booth"] .31 At that time, Booth, a
Michigan corporation that published eight daily and Sunday newspa-
pers, had a total at-will 32 subscription of approximately 460,000.'
3
3
Herald liquidated the Booth stock in 1977 pursuant to Code Sections
332 and 334(b)(2). These sections required Herald's adjusted
124. Newark Morning Ledger Co. v. United States, 113 S. Ct. 1670 (1993).
125. Id. at 1680-81 (holding any asset is depreciable whenever its value and limited
useful life is proved, regardless of how much it appears to resemble continued
patronage [(goodwill)]); Newark Morning Ledger, 945 F.2d at 566 (holding that a
purchased subscriber list is non-depreciable because it is a customer structure that
includes the expectancy of continued patronage, which is the essence of non-
depreciable goodwill); Newark Morning Ledger Co. v. United States, 734 F. Supp. 176,
185 (D.NJ. 1990) (holding that Morning Ledger was entitled to depreciate the paid
subscribers because it had established that the subscribers had limited useful lives and
ascertainable value separate from goodwill).
126. Newark Morning Ledger, 734 F. Supp. at 185.
127. Newark Morning Ledger, 945 F.2d at 568-69.
128. Newark Morning Ledger, 945 F.2d at 568 (concluding that the district court
applied the wrong definition of goodwill and if the correct definition had been applied,
"it [would have been] clear that Morning Ledger ha[d] not satisfied its burden").
129. Newark Morning Ledger, 113 S. Ct. at 1670. Justices Blackmun, Stevens,
O'Connor, Kennedy, and Thomas comprised the majority with ChiefJustice Rehnquist
andJustices Souter, White, and Scalia dissenting. Id. at 1671-72.
130. Newark Morning Ledger, 113 S. Ct. at 1680-81 (holding that an asset is
depreciable whenever its value and limited useful life is proved, "regardless of the fact
that its value is related to the expectancy of continued patronage").
131. Newark Morning Ledger, 945 F.2d at 556.
132. The subscribers' relationship with the newspaper was terminable-at-will,
meaning that they were under no contractual obligation to continue their subscriptions
into the future. Id.
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basis'3 5 in Booth's stock, $328 million, to be allocated among
Booth's depreciable and non-depreciable assets in accordance with the
respective fair market values of the assets. 13 6 Herald allocated about
$234 million among various financial and tangible assets.1 3 7  The
remaining $94 million was allocated among three intangible assets:
goodwill1 3 8 and going-concern value139 combined, and "paid sub-
scribers."4
0
The asset categorized as "paid subscribers" represented the dollar
amount of estimated future profits to be derived from the 460,000 at-
will subscribers acquired from Booth. 41  To this asset, Herald
assigned $67.8 million as adjusted basis. 42 On its tax returns for
1977 through 1980, Herald claimed deductions for assets acquired in
the Booth transaction. 143 Consistent with then-current law, Herald
made no attempt to claim depreciation for goodwill and going-
concern value.' 44 Herald did, however, claim a depreciation deduc-
tion for a portion of the $67.8 million allocated to paid subscrib-
ers. 14'5 The Service disallowed these deductions on the ground that
they should have been included in the amount allocated to non-
depreciable goodwill."'6 As a result, the Service determined that
Herald owed taxes and interest for each of the four years Herald had
taken the depreciation deduction on its tax returns.1 47  Conse-
quently, Herald paid the arrears in full.'"
135. Adjusted basis is the cost, or other basis, of property reduced by depreciation
taken and increased by capital improvements. BLACK'S LAW DICTIONARY 43 (6th ed.
1990).
136. Newark Morning Ledger, 945 F.2d at 556.
137. Id.
138. See supra note 1 and accompanying text.
139. Going-concern value is "'the ability of a business to generate income without
interruption, even though there has been a change in ownership.'" Ithaca Indus. v.
Commissioner, 17 F.3d 684, 687 (4th Cir. 1994) (quoting language from Ithaca Indus.
v. Commissioner, 97 T.C. 253 (1991)). The court noted that goodwill and going-
concern value are often referred to "conjunctively." Id. However, going-concern
relates to the continuity of income generation, while goodwill refers to the continuity
of the business relationship. Id.
140. Newark Morning Ledger, 734 F.Supp at 179.
141. Newark Morning Ledger, 113 S. Ct. at 1672-73.
142. Id.
143. Id. at 1673.
144. Brief for Petitioner at 5-6, Newark Morning Ledger Co. v. United States, 945
F.2d 555 (3d Cir. 1991) (No. 91-1135), reprinted in, 25 LAW REPRINTS, THE SUPREME
COURT OF THE UNITED STATES No. 5: NEWARK MORNING LEDGER CO. VERSUS UNITED
STATES OF AMERICA 153, 157-58 (1992-93).
145. Newark Morning Ledger, 113 S. Ct. at 1673.
146. Newark Morning Ledger, 734 F. Supp. at 177.
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In 1987, Herald merged into Newark Morning Ledger Company
[hereinafter "Morning Ledger"], a New Jersey corporation. 149 The
following year, Morning Ledger claimed a refund with the IRS for the
contested amount of paid taxes for "paid subscribers." 50  The
Service allowed the statutory period to lapse without taking action on
the refund claim. 1  Subsequently, Morning Ledger filed suit to
recover federal income taxes and interest it claimed the Service
erroneously assessed and collected. 5 '
B. The District Court
The case came before the district court of New Jersey as a Section
167 controversy. 53 At trial, Morning Ledger made strategic use of
expert witnesses to meet its burden under Section 167.114 To
prevail, Morning Ledger had to establish that the subscriber list was an
asset of limited useful life and had an ascertainable value separate and
apart from goodwill. 5 5 Experts were used to establish a value for
the paid subscribers 56 and to quantify their useful lives.'57  Both
sets of facts were essential for satisfying the two prongs of the Houston
Chronicle test,'58 which was the standard employed by the court for
evaluating the case. 159 While the government contested the method-
149. Id.
150. Id.
151. Id. Code Section 6532(a) confers refund suit jurisdiction on the court after
the Service either denies the claim or after six months have lapsed, whichever comes
first. 26 U.S.C. § 6532(a) (1988). See generally STEVEN C. SALCH ET AL., TAX PRAcTICE
BEFORE THE IRS §§ 15.36-15.38 (Shepard's/McGraw-Hill, Inc. 1994) (discussing how
the IRS' refund claim procedure).
152. Newark Morning Ledger, 945 F.2d at 557.
153. Newark Morning Ledger, 734 F. Supp. at 184.
154. See id. at 177-81.
155. Id. at 184.
156. Id. at 179 (determining goodwill value through the residual method).
Morning Ledger's experts, Messrs. Berkey and Grabowski, established the value of the
subscription lists by computing after-tax subscription revenues derived from the paid
subscribers, subtracting the collection costs of those revenues, and adding the present
value of the tax savings which resulted from the depreciation of the subscriber list.
Newark Morning Ledger, 734 F. Supp. at 183.
157. Id. at 180-81. The court noted that Morning Ledger's statistical expert, Dr.
Glasser, employed widely accepted statistical techniques. Id. at 181.
158. See supra notes 80-81 and accompanying text.
159. Newark Morning Ledger, 734 F. Supp. at 184-85. In the words of the court: "To
depreciate an intangible asset, a taxpayer must demonstrate as a factual matter that the
asset has: a limited useful life, the duration of which can be estimated with reasonable
accuracy, and an ascertainable value separate and apart from goodwill." Id. at 184.
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ology of Morning Ledger's valuation approach, it offered no evidence
to challenge the accuracy of the results obtained. 1"°
The court addressed the issue of goodwill within the context of the
Houston Chronicle test.' 6' The pivotal consideration was whether the
intangible asset "paid subscribers" 62 was separate and distinct from
goodwill. 63  By definition, the court reasoned, goodwill was a non-
wasting asset and was valued using the residual approach.' 14  The
court contrasted the non-wasting character of goodwill against the facts
established by Morning Ledger; that the list of paid subscribers had an
ascertainable limited life estimated with reasonable accuracy and was
valued directly.65 To the court, these characteristics sufficiently
separated "paid subscribers" from the concept of goodwill.
66
Likewise, the court observed that simply because the expenses
incurred to maintain the asset were deductible did not mandate a
finding that the asset itself was not depreciable. 67 Consequently, the
160. Id. at 181-82. The Supreme Court noted that the IRS made Morning Ledger's
burden lighter by stipulating to the value and useful lives of the paid subscribers.
Newark Morning Ledger, 113 S. Ct. at 1681. The thrust of the Service's argument rose
and fell on the issue of characterization: that a customer-based intangible is
indistinguishable from goodwill. Newark Morning Ledger, 734 F. Supp. at 184-85.
161. Newark Morning Ledger, 734 F. Supp. at 182-85.
162. Id. at 182-84. The court made it clear that "[g]oodwill is conclusively
presumed, per se, not to be depreciable." Id. at 184.
163. Id. at 184.
164. Id. at 182 ("Goodwill, by definition, has an indefinite life and is valued using
the residual method.").
165. Newark Morning Ledger Co. v. United States, 734 F. Supp. 176, 182 (D.N.J.
1990).
166. Id. at 176-77. The following excerpt displays the district court's analysis:
[T] he court recognizes and accepts that goodwill is the expectancy that
former customers will be retained-that there will be continued
patronage. However, one must distinguish between a galaxy of
customers who may or may not return, whose frequency is unknown,
and whose quantity and future purchases cannot be predicted, against
subscribers who can be predicted to purchase the same item, for the
same price on a daily basis. Although newspaper subscribers are under
no legal obligation to continue their subscriptions, expert opinion and
the evidence presented coupled with the common sense and experience
leads inescapably to the conclusion that the income derived from such
paying subscribers will recur, which, in turn, permits the ascertainment
of value separate and apart from goodwill. The income derived from
the subscribers permits the calculation of value over the useful lives of
the subscriptions or subscribers, and renders the subscribers acquired
subject to valuation as an asset separate and apart from goodwill.
Id.
167. Id. at 180 (noting that despite expensive efforts made to generate new
subscribers, Morning Ledger's market share had declined significantly over the last 20
years). Contra Calvin H. Johnson, The Mass Asset Rule Reflects Income and Amortization
Does Not, 56 TAx NOTEs 629 (1992) (advocating against depreciation deductions for
customer-based intangibles when replenishment of customers is accomplished with
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court concluded that Morning Ledger was entitled to depreciate the
value of its paid subscriber lists over their stipulated useful lives."ta
C. The Third Circuit Court of Appeals
On appeal by the Government, the Third Circuit Court of Appeals
reversed the district court on an error of law, stating that the district
court had applied the wrong definition of goodwill. 69 The court,
while recognizing the split in authority,7 ° determined that the
district court followed a minority view.'7 ' According to the Third
Circuit, the more appropriate test for determining the depreciability
of an intangible was when a taxpayer could demonstrate that the asset
was distinct from the notion of goodwill as the "probability that old
customers will resort to the old place." 72 The court held that
Morning Ledger's subscriber list was inseparable from the expectancy
of continued customer patronage.'73
Citing the pivotal Houston Chronicle case, the Third Circuit made two
noteworthy observations. First, the court stated that the mass-asset
rule'74 had no application to this controversy because the principle
deducted expenses).
168. Newark Morning Ledger, 734 F. Supp. at 178-79 (noting that the parties agreed
to the total fair market value arrived at by expert witnesses).
169. Newark Morning Ledger, 945 F.2d at 568 ("We conclude, in short, that the
district court applied the wrong definition of 'goodwill.'"). As recognized by the court
below, whether a taxpayer had met the requirements for depreciating an intangible
asset was generally a question of fact, consequently the court's review was based on a
"clearly erroneous" standard with de novo review of any misinterpretation or
misconstrual of law. Id. at 558.
170. See supra notes 84-92 and accompanying text.
171. The Third Circuit, looking at Houston Chronicle Publishing Co. v. United States
and Donrey, Inc. v. United States in particular depth, observed that Morning Ledger
"greatly overstated" the division in case law over the issue of characterizing goodwill.
Newark Morning Ledger, 945 F.2d at 563. In the midst of its review, however, the court
admitted "[t]he unavoidable fact is that there does exist authority bolstering Morning
Ledger's position." Id. at 565. The third circuit dismisses these cases as nothing more
than a "minority strand amid the phalanx of cases that have considered the definition
and application of the term 'goodwill' in the context of § 1.167(a)-3, and which
support the Service's position." Id. The court concluded that the great weight of
authority supported the Service's reading of Houston Chronicle. Id. at 563. However, the
court avoided a detailed case law analysis, reasoning that the "amount of ink ... spilled
over this subject already" was sufficient. Id. Instead, a cursory overview of relevant case
law became the heart of the court's reversal. Newark Morning Ledger, 945 F.2d at 565-67.
172. Newark Morning Ledger, 945 F.2d at 565.
173. Id. at 568 ("[F]or tax purposes, there are some intangible assets which,
notwithstanding that they have wasting lives that can be estimated with reasonable
accuracy and ascertainable values, are nonetheless goodwill and nondepreciable.").
174. See supra notes 77-80 and accompanying text (per se denying depreciation
deductions for assets possessing no determinable useful lives).
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had been outdated since Houston Chronicle.' Second, the Third
Circuit adopted the Service's interpretation of the two-pronged
Houston Chronicle test.'76 In light of its holding,'77 the Court con-
cluded that the district court had erred by ignoring the additional
requirement that paid subscribers be shown to be "separate and
distinct from goodwill." 78 This requirement was consistent with the
explicit statement in the Regulations that "[n]o deduction for
depreciation is allowable with respect to goodwill."' The court
concluded that the second prong of the test, that the asset "has a
limited useful life, the duration of which can be ascertained with
reasonable accuracy," 8° did not have a dispositive bearing on
whether the intangible asset was "goodwill."' Consequently, the
Third Circuit agreed with the Service's position that some intangible
assets were not depreciable, despite having limited useful lives
estimable with reasonable accuracy, because those assets were
otherwise indistinguishable from the traditional notion of good-
will.'
82
175. Newark Morning Ledger, 945 F.2d at 561-62 (reading Houston Chronicle as
rejecting the mass-asset rule).
176. Id. at 562-63; see supra text accompanying note 81.
177. The Service argued that the two-pronged test articulated in Houston Chronice
meant that depreciation was appropriate only in those circumstances where intangible
assets were "separate and distinct" from the legal notion of "expectancy of continued
patronage." Newark Morning Ledger, 945 F.2d at 562.
178. Id. at 568.
179. Treas. Reg. § 1.167(a)-3 (as amended in 1960).
180. Houston Chronicle Publishing Co. v. United States, 481 F.2d 1240, 1250 (5th
Cir. 1973), cert. denied, 414 U.S. 1129 (1974). The seminal passage from that decision
states the following:
Without compiling the myriad cases that discuss the "mass asset"
rule, we are satisfied that the rule does not establish a per se rule of
non-amortizability in every case involving both goodwill and other
intangible assets. In the light of § 167(a) of the Code and
Regulation § 1. 167(a)-3, we are convinced that the "mass asset" rule
does not prevent taking an amortization deduction if the taxpayer
properly carries his dual burden of proving that the intangible asset
involved (1) has an ascertainable value separate and distinct from
goodwill, and (2) has a limited useful life, the duration of which
can be ascertained with reasonable accuracy.
Id. at 1249-50.
181. Newark Morning Ledger, 945 F.2d at 567-68.
182. Id. at 568; see also Marc D. Levy et al., Supreme Court's Decision on Amortizing
Intangibles Removes One Barrier, 79J. TAX'N 4 (July 1993) (providing brief summation of
the Third Circuit's opinion).
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D. The Supreme Court
With the narrowest majority,' the Supreme Court reversed the
Third Circuit on error of law, holding that it had advanced the wrong
definition of goodwill as dispositive of depreciation."a4 The Court
observed that while the commonly cited description of goodwill as "the
expectancy of continued patronage"'85 was a useful label, it was of
little help to taxpayers trying to determine which of its assets qualified
for depreciation deductions. 86 The majority opinion noted that
every intangible asset is associated to some extent with customers'
repeat business (goodwill)." 7 Despite this association, the Code
permits depreciation for some intangible assets1 8 Consequently,
the Court emphasized that the appropriate question was not how
closely related to the expectancy of continued patronage is the
intangible asset, but instead, whether the intangible asset is deprecia-
ble notwithstanding the closeness of that relationship.'89
Going back to Red Wing Malting,'90 the Court observed that the
historical rationale for prohibiting depreciation deductions for
goodwill was that it did not "suffer wear and tear."' 9 ' Regulatory
authority, on the other hand, authorized depreciation for measurably
"wasting" intangible assets. 92 Therefore, the dispositive characteris-
183. Justices Blackmun, Stevens, O'Connor, Kennedy, and Thomas comprised the
majority; with ChiefJustice Rehnquist andJustices Souter, White, and Scalia dissenting.
Newark Morning Ledger Co. v. United States, 113 S. Ct. 1670, 1671-72 (1993).
184. Id. at 1681 ("[Wle now hold that a taxpayer able to prove that a particular
asset can be valued and that it has a limited useful life may depreciate its value over its
useful life regardless of how much the asset appears to reflect the expectancy of
continued patronage ....").
185. Id. at 1675 (citing Boe v. Commissioner, 307 F.2d 339, 343 (9th Cir. 1962)).
186. Id.
187. Id. at 1675-76. The Court makes the observation that any business' intangible
assets are related to fostering future customer patronage. Id. at 1673-76. Consequently,
to a certain extent all intangibles fall under the broad umbrella of goodwill. Id. at 1676
n.9.
188. Newark Morning Ledger, 113 S. Ct. at 1676.
189. Id. The Court further noted: "We emphasize that while the 'expectancy of
continued patronage' is a serviceable description of what we generally mean when we
describe an intangible asset that has no useful life and no ascertainable value, this
shibboleth tells us nothing about whether the asset in question is depreciable." Id. at
n.9.
190. Red Wing Malting Co. v. Willcuts, 15 F.2d 626 (1926), cert. denied, 273 U.S. 763,
(1927).
191. Newark MorningLedger, 113 S. Ct. at 1676 (referring inferentially to I.R.C. § 167
and accompanying Regulation § 1.167(a)-3)).
192. Id. at 1680 (citing Red Wing Malting, 15 F.2d at 633). In a 1968 Revenue
Ruling, the IRS stated that the original costs of dredging during the construction of a
pier were not depreciable, but the periodic re-dredgings were depreciable intangible
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tic for depreciation was the notion of limited life.' 9 Whenever a
taxpayer met the factual burden of proving with reasonable accuracy
that the value of an intangible asset diminished over an ascertainable
period of time, it logically followed that depreciation deductions were
permissible.194 This allowance was valid regardless of the proximal
relationship between the intangible asset and the "expectancy of
continued patronage. "195
In addition, the Court reaffirmed the mass-asset rule's vitality in
response to the Third Circuit's observation that it was "outdated."1
96
As with goodwill, the mass-asset rule had been used to deny deprecia-
tion for those intangibles that, although fluctuating, did not dimin-
ish.'97 The Court adopted the district court's finding that "paid
assets. Rev. Rul. 68-483, 1968-2 C.B. 91. According to the Service, the litmus test for
whether an intangible was depreciable depended on "the determination that the asset
is actually exhausting, and that such exhaustion is susceptible of measurement." Id. at
91-92. This ruling was later modified to the extent that costs for excavating and
dredging were characterized as tangible property, not intangible. Rev. Rul. 75-137,
1975-1 C.B. 74. The depreciation litmus test itself remained unchanged. Id.
193. Newark Morning Ledger, 113 S. Ct. at 1680-81.
194. Id. at 1680.
195. Id. at 1680-81. The Court observed: "The entire justification for refusing to
permit the depreciation of goodwill evaporates, however, when the taxpayer
demonstrates that the asset in question wastes over an ascertainable period of time."
Id. at 1680. Further clarifying its position, the Court stated: "The significant question
for purposes of depreciation is not whether the asset falls 'within the core of the
concept of goodwill,'. . . but whether the asset is capable of being valued and whether
that value diminishes over time." Id. at 1681 (citation omitted). Making a related
observation, the GAO, in a report on potential solutions to the intangible conundrum,
stated that allowing depreciation deductions was a valid solution because " [t] his policy
would be in accordance with the financial accounting standard that recognizes the
value of all purchased intangible assets, including goodwill, that are consumed over
time and, thereby, contributed to a business' ability to generate revenue." GAO/GGD-
91-88, supra note 62, at 33.
196. Newark Morning Ledger, 113 S. Ct. at 1677. According to the Supreme Court,
the Third Circuit read Houston Chronicle as the death knell for the mass-asset rule. Id.
Confronting this erroneous notion directly, the Court confirmed that the mass-asset
rule continued to "guide the decisions of the Tax Court with respect to certain intangi-
ble assets." Id. As an example, in Ithaca Indus. v. Commissioner, the Tax Court
prohibited depreciation allowances for the value of a trained work force over the
length of time each employee stayed with the company on the rationale that while the
number of employees fluctuated, one employee's leaving did not "interrupt or destroy
the continued existence of the whole." Ithaca Indus. v. Commissioner, 17 F.3d 684
(4th Cir. 1994), affg 97 T.C. 253, 267 (1991). The asset changed in character, but
never actually diminished because each employee was only one component of the
'assembled work force." Newark Morning Ledger, 113 S. Ct. at 1676-78 (citing Ithaca
Indus., 97 T.C. at 271).
197. Newark Morning Ledger, 113 S. Ct. at 1676; see Golden State Towel 373 F.2d at 938
(holding customer list a non-depreciable mass-asset). In Golden State Towel the Court
of Claims made an explicit link between goodwill and the mass-asset principle, stating:
19951
25
Skytte: Changing the Rules, but not the Goodwill Game: Newark Morning Led
Published by Mitchell Hamline Open Access, 2014
WILLIAM M!TCHELL LAW REVIEW
subscribers" were not self-regenerating, but wasted over an ascertain-
able period of time. 98 Morning Ledger had satisfactorily shown that
"paid subscribers" was a finite set of subscriptions that diminished in
value over a reasonably quantifiable time period.' 99 In so ruling, the
Court clarified the mass-asset principle in a manner consistent with its
reading of the Houston Chronicle test.
2°°
V. Internal Revenue Code Section 197
Soon after the Newark Morning Ledger decision, Congress enacted
Code Section 197,201 which addressed the depreciation-of-intangibles
issue directly.2 2  During the 1980s the scope of the intangible
controversy grew to distressing proportions.203 According to a 1991
"[A] purchased terminable-at-will type of customer list is an indivisible business
property with an indefinite, nondepreciable life, indistinguishable from-and the
principal element of-goodwill, whose ultimate value lies in the expectancy of
continued patronage through public acceptance." Id. at 944.
198. Newark Morning Ledger, 113 S. Ct. at 1681, 1683. The majority conceded that
the district court would have had more difficulty deciding the case if the Service's trial
strategy had involved challenging the evidence presented by Ledger's experts. Id. at
1681. However, the Service chose not to attack the accuracy of Ledger's estimations,
but instead focused on methodology. Id. at 1683. "[T]he Government chose ... to
rest its entire case on a legal argument that we now reject. This case was lost at trial."
Id. at 1682 n.14.
199. Id. at 1681. The opinion recognized that the dissent predominantly
questioned whether Morning Ledger met its burden of proof concerning the "wasting"
aspect of "paid subscribers." Id. at 1681-82, n. 14 (citing dissenting opinion at 1686-89).
200. Id. at 1676-77. The Court stated: "Although there may have been some doubt
prior to 1973 as to whether the mass-asset rule required that any asset related to the
expectancy of continued patronage always be treated as nondepreciable goodwill as a
matter of law, that doubt was put to rest by... the Houston Chronicle case." Id. As
further clarification, the Court discussed Richard S. Miller & Sons, Inc. v. United States,
537 F.2d 446 (Ct. Cl. 1976). Id. at 1678. There, the Court of Claims had permitted
deductions for purchased insurance expirations, which it viewed as a "mass-asset." The
court reasoned that the mass-asset rule did not mandate disallowance of depreciation
deductions when "the expirations as a single asset can be valued separately and the
requisite showing made that the useful life of the information contained in the
intangible asset as a whole is of limited duration." Richard S. Miller, 537 F.2d at 452.
See Reuven S. Avi-Yonah, Newark Morning Ledger: A Post-Litem and Some Implications, 59
TAX NOTES 813, 815-16 (1993) (noting that the Supreme Court majority in Newark
Morning Ledger essentially emasculated the mass-asset rule with its reasoning).
201. The Newark Morning Ledger decision came down on April 20, 1993, while Code
Section 197's enactment date was August 10, 1993-a time lapse of less than four
months.
202. I.R.C. § 197. Pursuant to the new Section, "A taxpayer shall be entitled to an
amortization deduction with respect to any amortizable Section 197 intangible." I.R.C.
§ 197(a).
203. The General Accounting Office noted that during 1989 there were 2,166 open
audit issues related to taxpayer-claimed depreciation deductions challenged by the
Service. GAO/GGD-91-88, supra note 62, at 22. The taxpayer value attached to the
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General Accounting Office report, solicited by the joint Committee on
Taxation, the value of intangible assets linked to business acquisitions
reached $262 billion in 1987.204 The report recognized that con-
comitant to this astoundingly large sum of money were the potential
deductions and tax revenues at stake. 0 5 Of those cases examined
for the study (exclusively purchased-intangible-asset controversies)
2 0 6
roughly seventy percent involved deduction denials because the IRS
argued that the assets were "in fact goodwill and not amortizable."
2 7
The GAO report noted three possible alternatives for addressing the
depreciation problem. First, depreciation of intangible assets could be
expanded to include those that wasted over time, sometimes including
goodwill. 08 Second, depreciation could be disallowed altogether for
specific purchased intangible assets or categories of intangible assets
by categorizing them to have indeterminable useful lives as a matter
of law.2' Third, the current situation could be allowed to continue
without revision to the tax rules..2 " The GAO recommended that
Congress revise the current tax law to allow depreciation deductions
of a purchased intangible asset according to a specific statutory cost
recovery period,21' similar to the treatment of tangible assets.
212
This revision, it recommended, should include goodwill.
2 13
Congress enacted Code Section 197214 as part of the Omnibus
Budget Reconciliation Act of 1993.215 The new provision provides
intangibles in controversy totaled over $23 billion. Id.
204. UNITED STATES GENERAL AcCOUNTING OFFICE, GAO/GGD-91-88, Tax Policy:
Issues and Policy Proposals Regarding Tax Treatment of Intangible Assets, 10 (August 1991)
(attributing this rise, in part, to the brisk business acquisition activity during the 1980s).
205. Id. at 2.
206. The GAO noted that its analysis was based on data gathered by the IRS from
all pending cases involving purchased intangible assets. Id. at 3 (noting that the cases
generally involved the tax years 1979 to 1987).
207. Id. at 21. The report recognized the bases for this high percentage by stating:
"The vague definition of goodwill, as well as taxpayers' latitude in determining useful
life, has led to frequent disputes between taxpayers and IRS." Id.
208. GAO/GGD-91-88, supra note 204 at 32 (citing then legislative proposals H.R.
1456, H.R. 3035, and S. 1245 as generally advocating this proposition).
209. Id. (citing then legislative proposal H.R. 563 as generally advocating this
position).
210. Id.
211. Id. at 6.
212. Id. at 33.
213. GAO/GGD-91-88, supra note 204 at 6.
214. See Brode, supra note 14, at 1012 n.2 (providing synopsis of the legislative
history); Bennett Minton and Lee A. Sheppard, An Intangible Quandary: To Mhich
Taxpayers Go the Spoils ?, 55 TAX NOTES 1568 (1992) (providing legislative history for the
bill providing depreciation for intangibles).
215. Pub. L. No. 103-66, 107 Stat. 270 (1993); see Douglass, supra note 50, at 726-62
(providing a thorough explanation and analysis of Section 197).
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for a fifteen-year depreciation period for those acquired intangibles
that come within its scope.216 A "Section 197 intangible" is generally
defined as any Section 197 intangible (1) acquired after August 10,
1993,217 and (2) held in connection with a trade or business218 or
an activity described in Section 212.219 Following this general
proposition, Section 197 includes a "laundry list"22° of specific
216. I.R.C. § 197(a). The general rule states:
A taxpayer shall be entitled to an amortization deduction with
respect to any amortization Section 197 intangible. The amount of
such deduction shall be determined by amortizing the adjusted
basis (for purposes of determining gain) of such intangible ratably
over the 15-year period beginning with the month in which such
intangible was acquired.
Id. Section 197 applies generally to Section 197 intangibles acquired under a Section
338 stock purchase asset acquisition. H.R. CONF. REP. No. 213, 103d Cong., 1st Sess.
688-89 (1993), reprinted in 1993 U.S.C.CAN. 1088, 1377-78. Section 197 generally does
not apply if the intangible is created by the taxpayer or if the intangible is not created
in connection with a transaction or series of related transactions involving acquisition
of a trade or business or a substantial portion thereof. Id.
217. I.R.C. § 197(c) (1) (A) ("[T] he term 'amortizable Section 197 intangible' means
any Section 197 intangible ... which is acquired by the taxpayer after the date of the
enactment of this section . . ").
218. I.R.C. § 197(c)(1)(B). Determination of whether acquired assets constitute a
substantial portion of a trade or business is to be based on all of the facts and
circumstances, including the nature and the amount of the assets acquired as well as
the nature and amount of the assets retained by the transferor. H.R. CONF. REP. No.
213, 103d Cong., 1st Sess. 678 (1993), reprinted in 1993 U.S.C.CAN. 1088, 1367.
However this comparison is not determinative. Id. A group of assets is to constitute
a trade or business if the use of such assets would constitute a trade or business for the
purpose of § 1060 (special allocation rules for certain asset acquisitions), i.e., if the
assets are of such a character that goodwill or going concern value could under any
circumstances attach to the assets. Id. In addition, the acquisition of a franchise,
trademark or trade name is to constitute the acquisition of a trade or business or
substantial portion thereof. Id.
219. I.R.C. § 197(c)(1)(B). Code § 212 concerns expenses for the production of
income. I.R.C. § 212.
220. I.R.C. § 197(d)(1). This is a modification on the GAO's suggestion of
assigning specific recovery periods to the various intangible assets at issue. GAO/GGD-
91-88, supra note 62, at 33. The blanket 15-year depreciation schedule ultimately
adopted was likely an attempt at satisfying the two stated goals of enacting the section:
(1) eliminate depreciation-related controversies for intangible assets; and (2) simplify
the law regarding depreciation of intangible assets. Douglass, supra note 50, at 753
(citing first, Tax Treatment of Intangible Assets: Hearings Before the Committee on Ways and
Means House of Representatives, 102d Cong., 1st Sess. 44 (1991) at 22 (statement of
Chairman Rostenkowski) (remaining citations omitted)). Martin Gregorcich proved
prescient when in 1975 he wrote: "The dichotomy between amortizable and non-
amortizable intangibles thus is called into question. A presumption as to the limited
usefulness of all purchased competitive advantages, coupled with guideline lives (unless
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intangibles that are "Section 197 intangibles."221 That list includes
goodwill.22
Section 197 applies generally to "Section 197 intangibles" acquired
under Section 338 acquisitions. 2 3  Sections 338(b)(5) and 1060
provide for purchase price allocation among assets in the case of
certain acquisitions. Under regulations promulgated pursuant to that
authority, the purchase price of an acquired trade or business must be
allocated among the assets of the trade or business using the "residual
method."2 4  Section 1060 authorizes the Treasury Department to
221. I.R.C. § 197(d)(1).
222. I.R.C. § 197(d)(1)(a). Under Section 197, goodwill is "the value of a trade or
business that is attributable to the expectancy of continued customer patronage,
whether due to the name of a trade or business, the reputation of a trade or business,
or any other factor." H.R. CONF. REP. No. 213, 103d Cong., 1st Sess. 674 (1993),
reprinted in 1993 U.S.C.C.A.N. 1088, 1363.
223. H.R. CONF. REP. No. 213, 103d Cong., 1st Sess. 688-89 (1993), reprinted in 1993
U.S.C.C.A.N. 1088, 1377-78. It is interesting to note that the Conferees directed the
Treasury Department to conduct a continuing study of the implementation and effects
of Section 197, including effects on merger and acquisition activity (including hostile
takeovers and leveraged buyouts). Id. at 690, 1993 U.S.C.C.A.N. at 1379. The first to
be due no later than Dec. 31, 1994, then annually thereafter. Id. (As of this writing
no report has been made available.) The Wall StreetJournal reported that merger and
acquisition activity for the third quarter of 1994 was at its highest level since the Merger
and Acquisition ("M&A") boom of the 1980s. Greg Steinmetz, Mergers and Acquisitions
Ran At Record Pace in Third Quarter, WALL ST. J., Sept. 30, 1994, at Cl; see also Greg
Steinmetz, Salomon Tops M&A Listing For 9 Months, WALL ST. J., Oct. 5, 1994, at C1
(noting that during the first nine months of 1994 "every merger-and-acquisition shop
was living large"). While many factors likely provided impetus for this trend, such as
favorable interest rates, it is likely that the Newark Morning Ledger decision, along with
enactment of Section 197, were favorable factors in the decision-making of recent
corporate "raiders." See Persellin, supra note 91, at 211 (observing that the Newark
Morning Ledger decision benefits those participating in business acquisitions).
224. Treas. Reg. §§ 1.338, 1.1060-IT. Under the residual method, all assets of an
acquired trade or business are divided into the following classes: (1) Class I assets
generally include cash and cash equivalents; (2) Class II assets generally include
certificates of deposit, U.S. government securities, readily marketable stock or securities,
and foreign currency; (3) Class III assets include all assets other than those included
in Class 1, 11, or IV (generally all furniture, fixtures, land, buildings, equipment, other
tangible property, accounts receivable, covenants not to compete, and other
depreciable intangible assets); (4) Class IV assets include intangible assets in the nature
of goodwill or going concern value. H.R. CONF. REP. No. 213, 103d Cong., 1st Sess.
689 (1993), reprinted in 1993 U.S.C.CAN. 1088, 1378. The purchase price of an
acquired trade or business (as first reduced by amount of Class I assets) is allocated to
the assets included in Class II and Class III based on the value of assets included in
each class. Id. To the extent that the purchase price (as reduced by the amount of the
assets in Class I) exceeds the value of the assets included in Class II and Class III, the
excess is allocable to assets included in Class IV. Id. According to the House of
Representatives report: "It is anticipated that the residual method specified in the
regulations will be modified to treat all amortizable Section 197 intangibles as Class IV
assets and that this modification will apply to any acquisition of property to which the
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require the transferor and transferee, in certain asset acquisitions, to
furnish information to the Treasury Department concerning the
amount of any purchase price allocated to goodwill or going-concern
value. 25 Information furnished with respect to certain asset acquisi-
tions is to specify the amount of purchase price allocated to deprecia-
ble "Section 197 intangibles" rather than the amount of purchase price
allocated to goodwill or going-concern value. 26  Additionally,
taxpayers are required to furnish the amount of purchase price
allocated to intangible assets that are not depreciable Section 197
intangibles.227 The Conference Report stated explicitly that "[n]o
other depreciation or amortization deduction is allowed with respect
to a Section 197 intangible that is acquired by a taxpayer. "22
VI. Analysis
A. Relevance of Newark Morning Ledger Prior to Section 197
The Supreme Court's rejection of the substantivist test in Newark
Morning Ledger was a taxpayer victory."2 Among the benefits emanat-
ing from the decision were favorable treatment of acquired intangible
assets and greater certainty in the tax system.2" By resolving the
conflict between disparate judicial methods, Newark Morning Ledger
provided: (1) precedent for the depreciation of acquired customer-
based assets; and (2) a uniform test for the depreciation of intangible
assets.
bill applies." H.R. REP. No. 2141, 103d Cong., 1st Sess. 689 (1993), reprinted in 1993
U.S.C.CAN. 1088, 1378.
225. I.R.C. § 1060(b)(1) ("Under regulations, the transferor and transferee in an
applicable asset acquisition shall ... furnish to the Secretary... (1) The amount of
the consideration received for the assets which is allocated to goodwill or going
concern value.").
226. H.1R CONF. REP. No. 213, 103d Cong., 1st Sess. 689 (1993), reprinted in 1993
U.S.C.CAN. 1088, 1378. But see I.R.C. § 1060(b)(1).
227. I.R.C. § 1060(b) (3); see H.R. CONF. REP. No. 213, 103d Cong., 1st Sess. 689
(1993), reprinted in 1993 U.S.C.CAN. 1088, 1378.
228. H.R. CONF. REP. NO. 213, 103d Cong., 1st Sess. 673 (1993), reprinted in 1993
U.S.C.C.A.N. 1088, 1362.
229. But see George L. Middleton Jr. & Christian M. McBurney, The Morning After
Newark Morning Ledger: What Should Taxpayers Do Now? 59 TAX NOTES 817, 828 (1993)
(criticizing the facts-and-circumstances test as bad tax policy).
230. The Court's decision may also have motivated Congress to pass the new Code
Section 197 dealing with the depreciation of goodwill and other intangibles. The
urgency may have heightened so as to avoid exacerbating the significant pending
problems regarding intangibles litigation. See Middleton, supra note 229, at 826
(suggesting that Newark Morning Ledger may spur congressional interest in passage of
a bill providing depreciation for intangibles).
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First, to fairly distribute the tax burden, the method of calculating
gross income must be accurate. 3' To accomplish this end, the Code
generally seeks to match income and expenses in the taxable year to
which they are properly attributable. 32 The Supreme Court implicit-
ly recognized that the regulatory foundation for depreciation
deductions was, in part, this "matching" principle.233  Denying
depreciation deductions for the decline in value of an intangible asset
that the taxpayer proved had a limited useful life is inconsistent with
tax theory that seeks to tax net income." According to the Court,
this denial of depreciation deductions remained true regardless of how
closely related in appearance an intangible was to the expectancy of
continued patronage.2 35
231. See, e.g., INDOPCO, Inc. v. Commissioner, 112 S. Ct. 1039, 1043 (1992)
("[T]he Code endeavors to match expenses with the revenues of the taxable period to
which they are properly attributable, thereby resulting in a more accurate calculation
of net income for tax purposes.").
232. Id.
233. Newark Morning Ledger Co. v. United States, 113 S. Ct. 1670, 1680 (1993)
("[W]hen the taxpayer demonstrates that the asset in question wastes over an
ascertainable period of time.... [iit is more faithful to the purposes of the Code to
allow the depreciation deduction . .. ").
234. Net income is the difference between gross income and the cost of producing
that income. BLACK'S LAW DICTIONARY 1040 (6th ed. 1990). Under the Haig-Simons
theory, economic income in its broadest sense is "accretion," that is the change in value
of property rights. See Daniel N. Shaviro, An Efficiency Analysis of Realization and
Recognition Rules Under the Federal Income Tax, 48 TAX L. REV. 1, 7-8 (1992). Consequent-
ly, it would be inconsistent to deny a taxpayer an offset to taxable income for the
wasting value of an asset.
235. Contra Johnson, supra note 167, at 629. Johnson argues that permitting
deductions for customer-based intangibles, particularly those that are replenished with
tax-deductible expenditures, distorts income measurement. Id. at 631-32, 634.
Advocating the "glory" of the mass asset rule, Johnson notes that Morning Ledger's
subscriber base taken as a whole did not exhaust or depreciate, despite the attrition of
individual subscribers, because new subscribers were added. Id. at 631. When an
asset's value is maintained with expensed costs there is no diminishing capital worthy
of depreciation deductions. Id. "Under the mass asset rule of accounting, a taxpayer's
cost of acquiring a subscription base or similar intangible is to allow deduction of the
costs of replenishing or replacing the base, but to capitalize the initial cost of the base
without amortization." Id. at 631-32.
The argument becomes less convincing when a comparison is made between
acquired tangible assets and acquired intangible assets. The tax treatment for both
categories of assets sacrifices perfect congruity with economic reality in order to achieve
other important policy ends. For example, the accelerated cost recovery system (ACRS)
dislocates depreciation from an acquired tangible asset's true "wasting" nature, but
fulfills its simplifying purpose. Accepting this inconsistency, why should greater
allegiance to economic reality be forced on acquired intangibles at the expense of
simplicity? To be certain, 'two wrongs don't make a right," butJohnson's proposition
would effect an unwarranted and undesirable tax preference for tangible assets over
intangible assets. In its decision, the Supreme Court made no distinction between the
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Second, vague definitions have no place in modern tax law. By
establishing a uniform test for depreciation, Newark Morning Ledger
provided much awaited certainty to identifying depreciable intangible
assets. As noted by the Court, defining goodwill as "expectancy," while
convenient, was irrelevant, did not address the problems of the federal
tax laws, and was of no analytical use in the present case.136 It was
this vague definition of goodwill, along with the conflicting tests, that
vexed taxpayers and fueled the litigation fire.23 7  The Supreme
Court's reasoning demonstrated that although non-depreciable
goodwill might be the elusive concept of "continued patronage,"
depreciable intangibles could be carved out of "goodwill" when shown
to have ascertainable values and limited useful lives.2 38 While the
decision was by no means a cure-all, it was a significant step in the
direction of bringing consistency to a troubled area of tax law.
B. Relevance of Newark Morning Ledger After Section 197
With the enactment of Code Section 197, questions arise concerning
what purpose, if any, Newark Morning Ledger now serves in tax planning
and controversies. At first glance it might appear that the dramatic
addition of Section 197 to the Code mooted this hard-fought taxpayer
victory. Now goodwill, along with other "controversial" intangible
assets, is expressly depreciable under the Code. Despite this change,
any rumor of the decision's precedential "death" are greatly exaggerat-
ed.23 9 Newark Morning Ledger continues to play a significant, albeit
smaller, role in tax law as controlling precedent with respect to three
depreciation of tangibles and intangibles based on how related, post-acquisition
expenditures were treated. Newark Morning Ledger, 113 S. Ct. at 1680. Instead, the
Court confirmed that the fundamental rationale for depreciating "any asset" was that
it wasted over an ascertainable period of time. Id. at 1680-81.
236. Newark Morning Ledger, 113 S. CL at 1675-76.
237. See GAO/GGD-91-88, supra note 62, at 20. The GAO observed:
The vague definition of goodwill, as well as taxpayers' latitude in
determining useful life, has led to frequent disputes between
taxpayers and IRS. Some of these disagreements have been
resolved in the courts, where the decisions have been influenced by
the most convincing evidence. This situation has resulted in
inconsistent treatment of similarly situated taxpayers.
Id.
238. Donrey, 809 F.2d at 536-37; see also Newark Morning Ledger, 945 F.2d at 563
(recognizing the Donrey court's implicit adoption of the residual definition of goodwill).
A concomitant benefit to the residualist test, as opposed to the substantivist definition,
is its fluidity. In other words, the residualist approach will apply consistently to future
intangible assets that have yet to be identified. Id. at 563-64.
239. It was Mark Twain who cabled the Associated Press from Europe, quipping:
"The report of my death was an exaggeration."
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important issues concerning both Section 197240 and non-Section
197 intangible24' assets: (1) valuation issues, (2) duration issues, and
(3) characterization issues.
1. Valuation Issues
The Newark Morning Ledger decision affirmed the "facts and
circumstances "242 approach to intangible asset valuation. The Court
recognized that the taxpayer's burden of proof to establish value
"often will prove too great to bear,"243 but is nonetheless viable. As
required by the Code, the purchase price of an acquired business must
be allocated across all the purchased assets using the residual
method. 24" Thus, the incentive remains for the taxpayer to allocate
as much of the purchase price to those assets with the shortest
recovery period.245 If the IRS challenges the amount that a taxpayer
allocated to "Section 197 goodwill," the taxpayer may use the holding
of Newark Morning Ledger to prove its claimed allocation with sufficient
evidence. These value-allocation issues arise in both inter-class
246
and intra-class247 purchase price allocations pursuant to Code
Section 1060.248
240. I.R.C. § 197(d) (designating specific Section 197 intangibles). A taxpayer has
the option of retroactive application of Section 197 to acquisitions made between July
26, 1991, and August 10, 1993 (the enactment date of Section 197). H.R. CONF. REP.
No. 213, 103d Cong., 1st Sess. 691 (1993), reprinted in 1993 U.S.C.CAN. 1088, 1380.
See MARTIN D. GINSBURG & JACK S. LEVIN, MERGERS, ACQUISITIONS AND LEVERAGED
BUYOUTS 403.0446 (1994) (providing further discussion of effective dates and
taxpayer electives).
241. Section 197 excludes pre-Section 197 intangibles (those acquired prior to
August 10, 1993), as well as a number of intangible assets listed in § 197(e), such as:
(1) interests in corporations, partnerships, trusts and estates, (2) financial interests in
contracts, (3) interests in land, (4) certain interests in computer software, (5) interests
in separately acquired films, sound recordings, video tape, books or the like, (6)
interests in separately acquired governmental or contract rights to tangible property or
services, (7) interests in separately acquired patents or copyrights, (8) interests under
leases, (9) interests in indebtedness, (10) sports franchises, (11) interests in separately
acquired mortgage servicing rights, and (12) certain transaction costs. I.R.C. § 197(a),
(e).
242. See supra notes 184-187 and accompanying text.
243. Newark Morning Ledger, 113 S. Ct. at 1681.
244. I.R.C. §§ 338, 1060.
245. See Coff & Flamholtz, supra note 15, at 37 ("In its current form, this bill would
create incentives to allocate the purchase price to equipment and other assets with a
useful life of less than fourteen years and might actually provide a disincentive for
acquiring land and buildings which have longer useful lives.").
246. Inter-class allocation of purchase price, pursuant to Code § 1060, refers to
allocations between assets of different classes.
247. Intra-class allocation refers to purchase price allocation, pursuant to Code
§ 1060, to assets falling within one of the four designated classes.
248. See supra notes 218-223 and accompanying text.
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First, the issue of asset valuation remains unsettled for allocations
between classes of assets in a business acquisition. For example,
purchaser R acquires target business T and allocates the purchase
price across all classes of acquired assets consistent with provisions of
the Code and Regulations.249 The IRS denies R's depreciation
deduction amounts claiming that R over-valued non-Section 197 assets
with shorter depreciation periods and under-valued Section 197
intangibles. In response, R presents its expert's assessments and other
evidence to factually support its valuation contentions. The persuasive-
ness of R's argument must be considered against the substantial
burden of proof that accompanies the "facts and circumstances"
method of valuing intangible property.
Second, valuation issues also remain in allocations within the class
of Section 197 intangibles.250 While the depreciation allowance of
previously non-depreciable intangible assets is clearly favorable for
most taxpayers, the imposition of a mandatory fifteen-year deprecia-
tion schedule is not.2"' The rationale for this flat rate was tax
revenue balancing, 252 that is, the tax revenues lost by permitting
depreciation deductions for goodwill were made up by stretching out
the shorter depreciation periods for other Section 197 intangibles.
For example, while the value of acquired goodwill can now be
depreciated under Section 197, the value of all non-compete covenants
acquired in a purchase are subject to the same fifteen-year sched-
ule 255 regardless of their actual duration (typically less then fifteen
years). Although extended depreciation periods for assets with
factually shorter lives is unfavorable for taxpayers, there are tax
planning opportunities that can work to the advantage of taxpayers in
certain types of acquisitions. 254  The after-effects of Section 197's
249. See supra note 224.
250. According to the House of Representatives report: "It is anticipated that the
residual method specified in the regulations will be modified to treat all amortizable
Section 197 intangibles as Class IV assets and that this modification will apply to any
acquisition of property to which the bill applies." H.R. CONF. REP. No. 213, 103d
Cong., 1st Sess. 689 (1993), reprinted in 1993 U.S.C.CAN. 1088, 1378.
251. See supra note 13 and accompanying text. See generally GINSBURG & LEVIN supra
note 240, 403.044-.0447 (1994) (discussing the impact of Code Section 197).
252. Kevin M. Helmich, The Amortization of Intangible Assets: An Analysis of H.R 3035
Proposed by House Ways and Means Committee Chairman Dan Rostenkowsk4 55 TAX NOTES
987, 989-90 (1992) (noting that House Ways and Means Committee Chairman Dan
Rostenkowski wanted to make the effect of the new Code section as revenue neutral
as possible).
253. I.R.C. § 197(d)(1)(E).
254. See GINSBURG & LEVIN, supra note 240, at 403.0445 (1994). The blanket
treatment of Section 197 intangibles calls for new tax planning considerations,
particularly for taxpayers acquiring businesses where goodwill constitutes a significant
portion of the purchase price. Id. Under pre-Section 197 law, taxpayers allocated as
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blanket fifteen-year depreciation period, however, are some of the very
same revenue-to-expense distortions that taxpayers, like Newark
Morning Ledger, sought to rectify. In other words, Section 197's
enactment neither produced an incentive to accurately value intangi-
bles within a class of assets, nor substantially furthered change towards
greater accuracy in the matching of expenses and deductions.
Consequently, Section 197's fifteen-year depreciation period has a
twofold impact: (1) it fails to shed light on resolving purchase price
allocation controversies between Section 197 and non-Section 197
assets;255 and (2) it treats the class of Section 197 intangibles identi-
cally without consideration of the actual revenue-to-expense effect on
any one taxpayer. Essentially, purchase price allocations between
classes of assets in business acquisitions remain status quo due to the
ubiquitous monetary incentives of shorter depreciation periods. 56
In addition, although Section 197 eliminates some of the monetary
incentive to contest reasonable allocations between Section 197
intangibles, potential tax planning benefits will continue to be a
consideration for buyers and sellers on intra-class allocations.
257
much purchase-price value to non-compete clauses, as opposed to goodwill, because of
the shorter depreciation schedule. Id. Now, under Section 197, a taxpayer might
actually benefit from allocating purchase price to goodwill rather than a non-compete
covenant because: (1) the seller's gain on the sale of goodwill is generally capital gain,
while a non-compete covenant is treated as ordinary income; and (2) goodwill has a
less adverse impact on generally accepted accounting principles ("GAAP") earnings in
the early years after acquisition because GAAP permits amortization of goodwill over
forty years, while a non-compete covenant is more short-lived. Id.
255. See Douglass, supra note 50, at 727 (noting that disagreements should be
minimized).
256. As noted by commentator George BrodeJr.:
In essence, by casting aside prior law and treating nearly every
intangible as a "Section 197 intangible" required to be written off
over a 15-year period, the roles of the Internal Revenue Service and
taxpayers now may be reversed. Thus, for example, the Internal
Revenue Service now may insist that a greater portion of the
acquisition price should be allocated to a "Section 197 intangible"
required to be written off over a 15-year period, while the taxpayer
might argue that the purchase price more properly is allocable to
certain tangible assets that may be written off over a shorter useful
life. Since the taxpayer has the opportunity to structure the form
of the transaction, careful attention should be paid to identifying
tangible assets having a useful life of less than 15 years and securing
fair market value appraisals that support taxpayers' allocation of the
purchase price over the tangible and intangible assets acquired.
Brode, supra note 14, at 1019-20; see Helmich, supra note 14, at 991 (observing that
determining the true value of tangible property is much easier than valuing intangibles,
thereby making misallocation-application controversies rare).
257. See GINSBURG & LEVIN, supra note 240.
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2. Duration Issues
By affirming the two-pronged Houston Chronicle test,
258 Newark
Morning Ledger remains controlling precedent for the "facts and
circumstances" approach 259 of establishing an intangible asset's
useful life. An intangible asset falling outside Section 197 potentially
has a duration-of-useful-life issue if it has a diminishing value. Since
taxpayers will continue to seek the shortest depreciation period
possible, the Service's challenges to these estimates remain valid
controversies. The enactment of Section 197 eliminates the controver-
sies for traditionally contentious intangibles, like customer-based assets,
by permitting depreciation over fifteen years.2' 6 In the realm of
intangibles falling outside the scope of Section 197, however, useful-
life issues remain open to argument.
For example, in a pre-Section 197 acquisition purchaser R acquires
target business T. As part of the deal, R now owns a trained work
force. In its purchase-price allocation, R seeks to depreciate the value
allocated to the work force over the average length of time the
employees remain with the company. The Service disallows the
deduction stating that the useful life of the asset is not reasonably
ascertainable. Pursuant to Newark Morning Ledger, taxpayer R presents
its evidence (for example, expert testimony and statistical studies) to
meet its burden of establishing a limited useful life for the assembled
work force asset. 261' The trier of fact then decides whether R's
burden of proof was met. In sum, while Section 197 enveloped a large
segment of the universe of intangible assets, duration issues remain,
particularly for pre-Section 197 intangibles caught in the backlog of
pending IRS controversies.
262
258. Newark Morning Ledger Co. v. United States, 113 S. Ct. 1670, 1683 (1993)
(providing that a taxpayer must prove an intangible asset possesses "an ascertainable
value and a limited useful life, the duration of which can be ascertained with
reasonable accuracy").
259. See supra notes 184-187 and accompanying text.
260. I.R.C. § 197(d).
261. Avery similar scenario was resolved by the United States Tax Court against the
taxpayer in Ithaca Indus. v. Commissioner. 97 T.C. 253 (1991), affd, 17 F.3d 684 (4th
Cir. 1994). In that case, a clothing manufacturer sought to depreciate $7.7 million for
the asset "assembled work force" of the acquired company. Ithaca, 17 F.3d at 686. The
Tax Court denied the deduction based on Ithaca's failure to prove that the asset's value
diminished over time or through use. Ithaca, 97 T.C. at 267. This decision has been
criticized on the basis that its analysis is reminiscent of the mass asset rule's denial of
depreciation for assets whose values "merely ebb and flow." See GINSBURG & LEVIN,
supra note 240, 1 403.045 (1994); Helmich, supra note 14, at 988-89.
262. Pursuant to Congressional urgings, the IRS offered a settlement initiative on
February 9, 1994, to taxpayers in pending intangible controversies. H.R. CONF. REP.
No. 213, 103d Cong., 1st Sess. 690 (1993), reprinted in 1993 U.S.C.CAN. 1088, 1379.
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Goodwill remains undefined by the Code and Regulations. The
Conference Report to Section 197, however, defined goodwill as the
value of a trade or business that is attributable to the expectancy of
continued customer patronage.2 63 It is uncertain what this means to
the characterization debate. If this statement means that Congress is
now adopting the substantivist approach to goodwill, then the practical
effect is that all intangible assets not specifically excluded from Section
197, yet resembling customer patronage, are swallowed up in this
broad definition and are depreciated over fifteen years.2" If instead
the definition is merely an acknowledgment of the long-standing
conceptual term-of-art, then the residualist approach of Newark
Morning Ledger remains a valuable planning and litigation tool with
respect to non-Section 197 assets as it may be used to differentiate an
intangible from Section 197 goodwill. It remains to be seen how the
definitional question will be resolved.265
Under the program, the taxpayer could elect to settle its case by accepting a reduction
in the amount of depreciable intangibles claimed by 15 percent or by an amount
sufficient to yield a 50 percent cost recovery for the intangible. See IRS Briefing
Materials, reprinted in TAX NOTES TODAY (Feb. 9, 1994) (LEXIS, FEDTAX, TNT file,
elec. cit. 94 TNT 30-8). The Conference Report contained the following statement:
"[N]o inference is intended that any deduction should be allowed in these cases for
assets that are not amortizable under present law." H.R. CONF. REP. NO. 213, 103d
Cong., 1st Sess. 690 (1993), reprinted in 1993 U.S.C.C.A.N. 1088, 1379. The practical
effect of this statement was to exclude goodwill from the settlement program.
Consequently, using the "facts and circumstances" argument in Newark Morning Ledger,
a taxpayer who believes that they have a strong factual position might reject the
settlement and pursue litigation. See generally Jones & Rood, supra note 16, at 196
(evaluating the Service's offer).
263. H.R. CONF. REP. No. 213, 103d Cong., 1st Sess. 674 (1993), reprinted in 1993
U.S.C.CAN. 1088, 1363.
264. The House Report expected that Section 197 would encompass all Class IV
intangibles, providing evidence for the substantivist notion of goodwill. In particular,
the House Report stated: "It is anticipated that the residual method specified in the
regulations will be modified to treat all amortizable Section 197 intangibles as Class IV
assets and that this modification will apply to any acquisition of property to which the
bill applies." H.R. CONF. REP. No. 213, 103d Cong., 1st. Sess. 689 (1993), reprinted in
1993 U.S.C.C.A.N. 1088, 1378. See Brode, supra note 14, at 1018 (noting that the
House Report requires modification of the "residual method" to reflect the amortiza-
tion of goodwill and going concern value).
265. Another related issue involves the interplay between Newark Morning Ledger,
INDOPCO, Inc. v. Commissioner, 112 S. Ct. 1039 (1992), and Section 197. In
INDOPCO, the Court held that banking fees, legal fees and transaction fees could not
be expensed but must be capitalized because they created significant long-term benefits
for the acquired entity. INDOPCO, 112 S. Ct. at 1045. See generally Lyke, supra note 91,
at 1239 (analyzing the decision and its effects). The fundamental issue in INDOPCO
was one of timing, since the expenses and fees would have been deductible either as
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Characterization issues also arise in the context of Section 197's
"anti-churning"26 rules. These rules exist to prevent abuse of the
newly established deduction allowances2 67 and to affect the tax
consequences of acquisitions when the acquiring taxpayer is related to
the seller.21 The scope of the anti-churning provisions is limited to
Section 197 intangibles that would not be depreciable without Section
197, which are essentially those intangible assets without a reasonably
ascertainable useful life, such as goodwill.
269
For example, characterization questions continue to exist for
intangible assets, like customer lists, under the anti-churning rules. If
the taxpayer cannot successfully distinguish the customer list from
goodwill by meeting its evidentiary burden under Newark Morning
Ledger, then the asset remains non-depreciable goodwill.27° On the
other hand, if the taxpayer's burden is met, establishing that the
customer list would have been depreciable under pre-Section 197 law,
expenses or amortized over the life of the underlying asset. Id. at 1239-40. In Newark
Morning Ledger, the Court was presented with an all-or-nothing proposition. Since
Section 197 was not yet enacted, if the Court had decided against distinguishing "paid
subscribers" from goodwill, then $68 million would have been identified as a non-
depreciable asset.
As an illustration of the problem, consider interests in indebtedness. An interest
in indebtedness, which is specifically excluded from Section 197 by Section 197(e) (5),
is often a capitalized cost under Section 263 when it involves "[any] amount paid out
for new buildings or for permanent improvements or betterments made to increase the
value of any property or estate." I.R.C. § 263(a) (1).
Suppose that purchaser R acquires target business T and the transaction includes
a two-year favorable financing option. How this option is treated has significant effects
on the timing of R's cost recovery. If, for tax purposes, the option stands alone, then
its value should be depreciable either over the two-year period or at its expiration.
Alternatively, if the value of the option is capitalized into T's factory, then the cost
recovery of the two-year option might be stretched out over the 39-year life of the
factory. Finally, if the option is capitalized into T's goodwill, then it is recovered over
the 15-year depreciation schedule of Section 197. It is likely that the Service will be
paying close attention to how the value of underlying assets is cost-recovered so as to
enhance revenue generation.
266. HR. CONF. REP. No. 213, 103d Cong., 1stSess. 691-93 (1993), reprinted in 1993
U.S.C.CAN. 1088, 1380-82. The anti-churning rules are meant to curb abuse by
preventing taxpayers from "converting existing goodwill, going concern value, or any
other Section 197 intangible for which a depreciation or amortization deduction would
have not been allowable under present law into amortizable property to which the bill
applies." Id. at 691, U.S.C.C.A.N. at 1380.
267. I.R.C. § 197(f) (9).
268. I.R.C. § 197(f) (9) (C) (defining "related person").
269. I.R.C. § 197(f)(9)(A)-(B). See GINSBURG & LEVIN, supra note 240, 1403.0444
(providing further discussion on Section 197's anti-churning rules).
270. GINSBURG & LEVIN, supra note 240, 403.0444.
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then the anti-churning rules do not apply and Section 197's fifteen-
year schedule takes effect.
271
Finally, it is certain that the persuasive power of Newark Morning
Ledger remains viable for those taxpayers opting into the Service's
settlement program for pending intangible controversies. 27 1 Con-
gress strongly urged the IRS to settle as many of the two thousand
pending intangible-related issues as possible.27 The report also
noted that then-current law would apply to intangibles acquired prior
to the enactment of Section 197.274 Since goodwill was not a depre-
ciable asset at that time, the Newark Morning Ledger decision supports
taxpayers possessing sufficient evidence to overcome the substantial
burden of proof involved in distinguishing depreciable intangible
assets from non-depreciable goodwill.
VII. Conclusion
The true nature of goodwill remains a nebulous concept in tax law.
In Newark Morning Ledger, the Supreme Court brought much needed
predictability to the muddled history of distinguishing depreciable
intangible assets from goodwill. Although the decision eschewed any
substantive definition of goodwill, it presented a consistent method for
identifying goodwill in an effort to achieve sound tax policy. The
subsequent enactment of Code Section 197 explicitly provided for the
depreciation of the elusive goodwill concept, thereby curing a
symptom of the disease that gave rise to the Newark Morning Ledger
controversy.
The addition of Section 197 to the Code brings welcome relief from
the burdensome expense associated with intangible-asset disputes,
particularly with respect to goodwill. The fifteen-year depreciation
period provided in Section 197, however, may be criticized on the
basis that it only marginally reflects the true "wasting" nature of any
one particular Section 197 intangible, thereby treating taxpayers from
varying circumstances identically. While the provision will likely
reduce the number of taxpayer protests, the Code change does not
deal with the root of the problem: the need for a clear definition of
271. Id.
272. See supra note 262.
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goodwill. In the aftermath of Section 197, Newark Morning Ledger
continues to provide precedential guidance to resolving valuation,
duration, and characterization issues related to intangible assets falling
both inside and outside the scope of Section 197.
Eric j Skytte
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